

ARMY




AUGUST 1956
50¢

NGUS



Irons in the Fire

"A" marks the Empire State Building. This is the way New York Harbor looks on the scope of an Army Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories radar placed at Sandy Hook, N. J. The white spot at extreme top marked "A" is the Empire State Building and the high ground of Central Manhattan. The white area marked "B" is Staten Island. The small circle has a radius of 10 miles and the figures in the large circle indicate direction. The photograph was made to determine good points for UHF and VHF TV, radio and telephone communications. All areas in white have good "line of sight" reception from the radar.



New "bear-paw" landing gear developed by Kaman Aircraft for its HOK-1 helicopter enables it to operate from snow, sand and mud.

Midget Drone Looks Like Heavy Bomber on Radar Screen. Outline superimposed on Army Ordnance action picture of Nike warhead detonation against Ryan's Firebee jet drone target shows how special reflective devices simulate appearance of a large bomber on tracking radar screens. The reflective devices are mounted in Fiberglas wing tip pods on the Firebee.

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
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


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Realizing the increased complexity of some of the nation's current defense system problems, General Electric has formed the Special Defense Projects Department. The new department will act as a Company focal point for large, highly complex missile projects. Headquarters for the new department will be located near Philadelphia, Pa. This new department has responsibility for large defense systems that require the combined research, development, and manufacturing resources of many of General Electric's operating departments and laboratories.

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ARMY

AUGUST 1956
Vol. 7 No. 1

Published by the ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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ARMY is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. ARMY strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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The Month's Cover

The Modern Minutemen of our National Guard constitute our really ready reserve. Design by McIver Studio; Photo by Los Angeles Evening Herald & Express.

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
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THE MONTH'S MAIL

Down to His Birthday Suit

- Of recent date one has seen that the Special Forces Groups have been honored with the green beret to show that they are of the *corps d'élite*. And of more recent date one sees that the Army is of a belief that the beret is too much of the type foreign for American soldiers to wear. Name of a diagonally striped camel of parentage uncertain!

Does not this Department de l'Armée Americain know that military chapeaux of pure Yankee descent are of the greatest scarcity? Is it desired that some day they shall perhaps wear the feathered war bonnet of the savage Indian or the coon-skin cap of the Davy Crockett, or of the Senator Kefauver?

Regard! When began the great Army of the United States, all the soldiers who had headgear had such as the cocked hats, the bearskins, and such as well dressed men of the armies of France and the Anglais. Those who used the American design were all bareheaded, unless they possessed a skin torn from the unfortunate coon. And this even has the precedents most European. Long ago the standard bearer of the Roman legion used the label of a former wolf to cover his bald spot. From the wolf to the coon is but a small degree and a few years.

Perhaps if one desires the pure military hat Americain, it might be done by using the Jeff Davis hat, the so horrible thing of 100 years ago. Could this not be done to celebrate the centenary of some event?

One hopes that the Army does not take all foreign items of uniform away. This would leave the soldier Americain garbed in his original skin, an item of purest civilian issue. The chance exists that the space cadet fad could be followed to adorn the troops with headgear of a most unique form. This is not of 100% U.S. origin, but M. Buck Rogers was assuredly Americain.

MONSIEUR JEAN

The Logistical Cost of Foxholes

- Colonel Kelly's article on the atomic foxhole [June], aside from being short and to the point is also a penetrating analysis of practical defense for the nuclear battlefield. To be sure, the foxhole does not offer absolute protection but, considering its cost, it offers a really worthwhile bargain in protection.

You may be pleased to learn that practically all the ideas advanced by Colonel

Kelly are now under consideration and are in varying stages of development. Feasibility of the explosive foxhole digger has been demonstrated, and there are several commercial items now available which will in some measure meet his requirement for a mechanical digger. . . .

It frequently happens in this business of developing military equipment that those who foresee a requirement do not always consider its logistical price. To be sure, the solution is easy if you are willing to ignore logistics. Something for nothing, logically speaking, is a happy dream—but only a dream. The idea of the mechanical foxhole digger is appealing almost entirely because of the labor and fatigue associated with producing foxholes by muscle power. A machine cannot dig a better foxhole than a man can dig with standard tools. The article indicates that a shovel will be needed to improve or embellish the mechanically produced foxhole, so it seems the D-handle shovel will not become obsolete. The total and final result of such a solution will be: a foxhole no better than now within the capability of our present manpower and equipment; a piece of heavy, complex machinery to further burden our groaning supply lines; and an indefinite saving of time for troops in combat.

There is no such thing as an ideal solution to the foxhole-digging problem. As of now, it looks like we will have foxholes in the next conflict and that they will be a valuable element of fortifications. The mechanical and explosive solutions which Colonel Kelly proposes are attractive but don't forget their impact on logistics. It may very well be that such machinery or gadgets will prove worth the logistical price, but in no case can we afford to ignore that price. The price in sweat and muscle paid by Caesar's legions when they dug in at bivouacs, may still be the price of survival on the battlefield!

COL. H. F. SYKES, JR.
Director

Engineer R&DL
Fort Belvoir, Va.

Gary and the Misslemen

- It was most generous of you to provide space in your magazine for the accurate and interesting review of the 79th AAA Missile Battalion's remarkably smooth assimilation by our community [June]. I can assure you that it was most gratefully

ARMY

appreciated by those of our citizens, from Mayor Peter Mandich on down, who have "put themselves out" in various ways in a common effort to make the men of the 79th feel comfortably and completely "at home" in this teeming steel metropolis.

Although hundreds of magazine articles have been published from time to time about Gary and its people, it has not been often that we have been pictured to the world with the accuracy, warm sympathy and understanding which make Lieutenant Duerr's article truly outstanding, from our viewpoint.

ERWIN CREWE ROSENAU
Executive Secretary

Gary Chamber of Commerce
Gary, Ind.

• I would like to let you know that the article by Lieutenant Duerr about the public relations problems encountered by the 79th AAA Battalion in Gary was of considerable interest to people here at Bliss. This article really struck home to many of our personnel inasmuch as this is a problem which many of us have faced in the past, and of course many will face in the future.

BRIG. GEN. ALBERT G. FRANKLIN, JR.
Assistant Commandant
AAA&GMS
Fort Bliss, Texas

Birds and Bullets

• Your argument that since missiles don't have wings they are properly the business of Army Ordnance ["What You Should Know About Bird and Bullets," June] leaves me cold. Do you ninnies think Ordnance can build them? Of course not. They'll be built by the aircraft industry, which means that they are properly part of the Air Force.

CALL ME SAGE MASTER

Cocoa, Fla.

• By this logic, since the Food Machinery Corporation makes one version of the Army's armored personnel carrier, APCs should be procured by the Quartermaster Corps instead of by the Ordnance Corps. While the aircraft industry is making and will make a great contribution to the development of a family of missiles, they will not be alone. Two non-aircraft manufacturers—Firestone Tire and Rubber and Chrysler Corporation—are both engaged in missile work. And there are others.

Bring Up the Snipers


• Much has been said concerning marksmanship training, in **ARMY** and other magazines, but ninety per cent of this concerns the sad task of teaching the average American John Recruit how to keep the bulk of his slugs inside the 3-ring from the prone. The recently devel-

oped Trainfire seems practical since very few of the opposition have worn clearly identified bull's-eyes since the white crossbelts faded out. But there is an advanced class of marksmen who are left out of the deal. . . .

The use of snipers in modern warfare has not received too much attention in recent times. Quite a few people claim that it is too hard to hit a man at ranges beyond 500 yards. Everyone knows that. That's the point. If a man feels safe by himself 800 yards away from the average U.S. outfit and some exceptional character hangs one on him, it may tend to give the rest of his pals the view that the low monopoly capitalizing so-and-sos are good people to avoid.

The sniper properly trained can hit at ranges where the average man calls for Divarthy, and when he gets a target closer in, it is usually TS for the same. He can use his superior gear to knock off the automatic-weapons men, and if he has a good spotter he can break up the chain of command merrily by dusting off the higher brass when such show up. Failing that, he can annoy company officers and NCOs, which can play hell with mechanically disciplined troops.

During the late what-was-it in Korea, a few ornery souls—notably Major W. S. Brophy of 7th Division ordnance—made up illegitimate sniper outfits with Red



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
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PTR actions with .50 barrels hung on. Brophy caused a few changes in vital statistics and no doubt still has one shoulder black and blue from the recoil. But the ones he lowered the boom on will never get to be corporals and plague us in future years.

* * *

The sniper should be a recognized specialist in his trade, whether he is in straight infantry, or with armor, or airborne. One of him in the right place can be a strong influence for good. Economical, too. . . .

Sniping calls for good weapons, good ammo, and good men to use them. But it is not impossible. I am no great shakes as a rifleman, but I have hit targets at a thousand with a condemned '03 and odd lots of .30 AP. A well-trained sniper with a scope and better eyes could hit targets which would shoot at him at the same range. They *would* shoot, but if he hits them they won't live to.

Perhaps a few thousand bucks spent on the training and equipment of snipers in time of peace might save much more in time of war. . . .

CWO JOHN P. CONLON

Newark, Ohio

Thanks

• I feel that with your magazine, various correspondence courses and summer training, I am better qualified as an officer

than I was during World War II. Your information on the newer developments furnishes data that enable me to see more clearly the problems of modern defense from a down-to-earth level rather than a sensational or impractical angle. The articles dealing with tradition history, Army development and accounts of recent engagements all over the world furnish a more solid foundation upon which to apply knowledge gained at the present.

MAJOR JOHN H. ROCKEL
Infantry, USAR
Hilltown, Penna.

AA Gunners in the Ground Role

• "Targets of Opportunity," by Lt. Col. Willard L. Jones [June], gives a well-deserved plug for AAA gunners, but Colonel Jones, as a historian, needs to sharpen up his facts. His credit to General Armstrong and his AAA gunners for the defense of Antwerp against the V-1 bombs is solid enough, but when he implies that "a wing of General Armstrong's Antwerp X defense" sparked the ground defense of Liège when the Germans advanced in the Bulge, he should get back to the facts and give the credit to those who earned it—the AAA battalions in First Army. It is all in the record. Here briefly are the facts:

¶ Lt. Col. Sandy MacGrain's 413th AAA Battalion was recommended for a Dis-

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ARMY

tinguished Unit Citation for employment in the ground role on D plus 1 (7 June 1944) and for breaking up the attack of a German armored division in the Forêt de Balleroy. MacGrain was awarded the Silver Star.

Prior to St. Lô several First Army AAA gun battalions were stripped down and employed as the basic AT and AM defense of the beachhead; also reinforced FA fires.

Colonel Don Bailey's AAA Group did a lot of fighting in Normandy, pioneering in the employment of AAA 40mmms and quad .50s in the ground role.

When the Battle of the Bulge started, First Army had a separate gun and AW defense belt on the Dreborn Ridge well forward of Liège. These units were swung around to protect the south flank of V Corps. We borrowed seven AAA gun battalions from 21st Army Group and employed them, together with the First Army AAA units, directly under Army control and played chess with German tank columns. Battery B, 143d AAA Gun Battalion, was one of the units to draw a Distinguished Unit Citation for destroying German tanks. Speaking of these AAA battalions, General Hodges said, "Without their mobility, fine shooting and unfailing communications, the German breakthrough would have been much more difficult to stop."

These First Army AAA battalions deserve the credit for pioneering in the ground role, and we can still learn from their actions. We Americans have a habit—a bad one—of suddenly discovering something new in the way of military application. Isn't it about time we began accepting the lessons of the past and using them as a springboard rather than as an anchor? Korea didn't prove anything new; we just learned the lessons of WWII, which we had forgotten—or at least about which we had done little.

COL. C. G. PATTERSON

Hq ABMA
Huntsville, Ala.

- Colonel Patterson served as First Army's AAA Officer throughout the World War II campaigns in Europe.

Engineering Mobility

After reading the many articles in **ARMY** written by members of the airborne and armor extolling their respective capabilities to achieve the maximum strategic and tactical mobility, it was indeed satisfying to read the articles by General Sturgis and Colonel Burke [April] which indicate that the responsibility for mobility rests on the Corps of Engineers.

History is full of incidents to prove this point. General Grant would never have been able to control the Mississippi and thus split the Confederacy had it not been for the bridge- and road-building capabilities of his engineers. . . .

In World War II, the invasion of Italy depended on the engineers' ability to build airfields to accommodate the much-needed air cover. The Normandy invasion would have failed had not the engineers been able to build port facilities in record time to support the invasion arms logically. Without the rapid construction of airfields, finally to carry the war to Japan, the island campaigns of the Pacific would have been practically useless. Large resistance forces in China would have been forced to surrender had they not been resupplied via the Burma and Ledo roads. All these incidents reflect mobility, the technique of rapidly bringing to bear at the decisive point the maximum effective effort, whether it be fire power, men, or matériel.

At present, the engineers are increasing the mobility of the nation's armed might by constructing in record time airfields in the remote areas of the world. They have done this in the subzero Arctic and in the desolate desert under conditions in which it was believed to be impossible to conduct large-scale construction.

Those who advocate a reduction of this construction ability should visualize the mobility of an armored unit with no bridges; an airborne unit with no airfields; an army with no ports, depots,

(Continued on page 54)



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As a rescue vehicle the HOK got its baptism of fire in the disastrous New England floods of August 1955, and came through admirably. Kaman is proud of these mercy missions. Kaman is also proud of the part it is privileged to play in the continuing program of National Defense.

AUGUST 1956

THE ARMY'S MONTH

The Army
Is Men

If you would seek out the pulse of an army to see if its heart is sound and strong, or if you desired to take a bearing on an army's soul, you wouldn't go near the research laboratories and arsenals or schools and headquarters from which the new hardware and new tactics are emerging. You would go down into the companies and batteries of the combat and combat-support units. You would go, in short, where the soldiers are. For an army's vitals are in the skill and fortitude of combat leaders. There is a tendency—a dangerous one—to forget this in these days of technological and managerial revolutions.

It is especially easy to forget this when you think in terms of "personnel," "slots," "spaces" and skills.

Right now there is a Department of Defense committee studying the prob-

lem of service pay—with emphasis on the possibility of offering higher pay to men who have skills much in demand in civilian life.

This is a complex and serious problem; no mistake about that. It is supposed to be especially critical in the Air Force but it is just as critical to the Army. And in its possible implications, more so. All the arms and services of the Army need many highly skilled technicians and the way the men the Army trains in these skills leave the Army for the greener pastures industry seems to offer is heartbreaking to those in charge of these programs. The Air Force has proposed that men with these skills should receive substantially higher pay than other men of the same rank or grade and years of service. This proposal is one of the matters the Coordinator Committee referred to above is studying.

A few questions immediately arise. Will more pay—even substantially

more—keep these technicians in uniform? Will not industry—responding to the laws of the marketplace—raise its inducements and overmatch the bids of the military services?

Another question is: What will this do to the morale and *esprit* of the key soldiers who are not skilled in a technique desired by industry but are skilled in the difficult and absolutely vital business of leading fighting men into battle? What will this do to the fighting heart and soul of the Army?

This is the one question among all those raised by this proposal that should be thoroughly explored but more than likely will not be.

Your trained fighting soldier knows that when he is committed to battle he will live under the most appalling conditions man can create, that his suffering will be prolonged, and that he may die an ugly death in the muck and mire of a battlefield far from home. These grim possibilities do not shake his spirit or weaken his resolve. But his spirit can be shaken and his resolve broken by ill-considered acts of commission or omission by those who send him into battle.

A soldier must feel proud and not ignominious. And this necessity must be considered at all levels at all times. Otherwise the heart and soul of the fighting man may become ravaged by doubts and unspoken resentments, and the gnawing feeling that he is the object of public contempt.

It is possible perhaps to devise a workable plan for retaining the skilled men the services must have without affecting the morale of others. But any such departure is a step that should be taken cautiously and with open eyes. Extra pay for hazardous duty is one thing; extra pay to meet the competition of the marketplace is something altogether different.

Men in uniform cannot be turned out on a lathe or shaped by a monster press on order. Unlike rivets and transistors, they are human beings capable of cussed contrariness and epic heroism.

ALL of this points up a danger area that could be overlooked. It doesn't



Miss Irene M. Ziehler (left), assistant forelady, and Mrs. Elizabeth Hewlett, forelady of embroidery section of Philadelphia QM Depot, discuss pattern for new flag of the U. S. Army. Flag was featured on cover of June ARMY.

Cessna's armored OE-2 protects Marine pilots

Cessna's reconnaissance-liaison plane—the OE-2—brings greater versatility to Marine Corps air operations, is specifically designed to give the pilot protection in combat.

The rugged plane's 220-m.p.h. dive-speed capability combines with its self-sealing fuel tanks, flak curtain and armored seats to give the Marine pilot maximum protection, get him in and out of targets, fast!

A more powerful version of Cessna's famed L-19, the OE-2 is the first liaison airplane with built-in target-marking capabilities. It also is used as an artillery spotter, to lay communications wire and to drop supplies to troop positions.

The versatile OE-2 meets a specific need, is another example of Cessna's cooperation with the military in planning for today's air age. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO., WICHITA, KAN.



Thick, nylon flak curtain and armor plate in rear compartment protect observer.



Flak curtain and armor plate afford pilot maximum protection.



Three-quarter inch armor plate fits under pilot and observer seats.



offer any answers. But for a broader look at the problem, we could turn to a general consideration of Army personnel problems. What are they?

As listed by Major General Donald P. Booth, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Army has four basic personnel problems:

• Reenlistments. This includes the problem of the loss of highly-skilled technicians but here is a significant fact revealed by General Booth. Among the 16,000 combat echelon noncommissioned officers which the Army doesn't have but needs are infantry light-weapons platoon sergeants. Now industry is not advertising for light-weapons platoon sergeants so something other than civilian demand is responsible for the failure of many infantry sergeants to reenlist.

• Loss of junior officers. Less than 20 per cent of the ROTC or OCS officers who serve obligated tours continue on active duty. What influence the known fact that most of these young leaders are in the Army only temporarily has on young enlisted men who serve under them is unmeasurable but could be considerable.

• Standard of living. This is one of the reasons why your infantry sergeant and also the technical specialist do not reenlist. Frequent family separations, lack of decent housing, and the diminishment of customary benefits all serve to drive the professional out of the Army. "Even if he is a senior NCO, a man with a family has difficulty achiev-

ing a living standard in the Army acceptable to him in comparison to what he might expect outside the service," General Booth has said.

• Two-year tour of duty. General Booth's statement on this is that the heavy turnover affects "efficiency, unit spirit, economy and battle worthiness." It is neither "conducive to economy nor stability. Seventy-one percent of the Army's enlisted strength is composed of personnel with less than three years' duty. About 35 percent of the Army are draftees who are with us for only two years. Then also, the law requires us to accept two-year enlistments to coincide with the two-year obligated tour of the inductee."

General Booth said that the Army accepted the five-point program offered by the Air Force to counteract these problems. Those five points are: (1) revised pay, (2) adequate housing, (3) medical care, (4) better commissary and post exchange service, and (5) educational rights.

The Cordiner Committee referred to earlier is studying the pay situation. Inadequate housing is going to remain for a long time, although some so-called Capehart housing is on the way (the Army needs about 95,000 additional family housing units at this time).

A new medical care bill has been enacted and awaits Department of Defense implementation before becoming effective. While less than a whole loaf, it may help the situation.

Nothing current is in the wind as

to PXs and commissaries. Restrictions on them make them less effective services than they should be.

The final suggestion is that men who remain in the service should have the same educational rights as men who left it to take advantage of the offered benefits.

Colonel 'Hump' to be Leveled through 'Savings'

A long-range approach to the problem of equalizing present and future promotion opportunity in the grade of permanent colonel of the Regular Army has been made by the Army.

The plan will provide all officers with equal selection opportunity to the top field grade.

Under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, promotion to permanent colonel is limited most stringently. The total number of permanent colonels is restricted to eight per cent of the total Regular officers authorized; and promotion may be made only as vacancies occur. Use of the "best-qualified" method of selection, too, insures a high degree of competition.

A large number of Regular officers are concentrated in the "year groups" with basic dates from 1940 to 1943. Unless action were taken now, the size of the groups would force the selection rate down when these large groups come up for consideration. By using a uniform selection procedure, a stable system has been designated.

It involves, in general terms, making

Eleven of 12 Fort Belvoir master sergeants selected to form The Engineer School's first Noncommissioned Officer Advisory Council were oriented on its responsibilities by Brigadier General D. W. Heiman, Assistant Commandant (end of table). At his immediate right is the Council's Chairman, Master Sergeant Robert W. Bockman; and on his left, the Vice Chairman, Master Sergeant Thomas J. Williams.





Combat commuter – *at 8 second intervals*

In recent tests duplicating actual assault landings, Fairchild C-123's gave dramatic evidence of performance under combat conditions.

The target—a rough, ungraded field—was ringed by "hostile" forces. Heavily laden, the C-123's approached the field at 500 ft. altitude—too low for heavy A.A. guns, too high for small-arms fire. Just short of their touchdown point, the highly maneuverable assault transports swept down, flaring out just as they flashed over the clearing's edge. Two minutes later, twelve C-123's had rolled to halt—troops and trucks were fanning out to their assigned positions. The C-123's had landed *at 8 second intervals!*

This dramatic demonstration of pilot and crew proficiency was made possible by C-123 maneuverability, short field performance and utter reliability—all three, features of Fairchild aircraft designs.



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room for those officers in the World War II hump by saving vacancies ahead. This means the application of uniform selection procedures to all year-groups coming up for permanent colonel—both now and in the future.

While the plan will permit an even application of promotion opportunity, it will *not* increase the authorized number of permanent colonels. This number is limited by law. The framers of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 recognized that, as a result of this limitation, all qualified officers could not be promoted to colonel. As a result, the mandatory pass-over and elimination provision applies only to the lower grades and is not applicable to the grade of permanent colonel. Upon becoming eligible for consideration for that grade, officers are considered each year until selected or until retired. Non-selection to the grade of colonel reflects in no way upon the individual qualifications of the officers concerned; nor does it alter the Army's continued reliance upon and need for their services.

All permanent lieutenant colonels will have about a two-out-of-three chance for selection regardless of their particular year-group. Thus, career opportunities for selection to this grade will apply across the board, into the foreseeable future.


Army to Take Over Two Air Bases

Wolters AF Base at Mineral Wells, Texas, was transferred to Army control on 1 July 1956, and Gary AF Base at San Marcos, Texas, will be transferred before 1 January 1957. Wolters will revert to its former Army designation (Camp Wolters); no name was selected for Gary as we went to press.

Gary will conduct primary fixed-wing pilot training, and the base will be contractor-operated by 700 employees. Five hundred officer-students will be in residence, with a programmed input of about 1,700 during FY-57. A permanent 45-man military detachment will also be stationed there.

Camp Wolters will be a military installation, to conduct primary cargo-helicopter pilot training. The base will accommodate 75 helicopter preflight students and 200 helicopter pilot students in residence, with a programmed annual input of approximately 600. Ci-

Mr. Brucker looks on as Dr. Ragnar Rollefson is sworn in as Chief Scientist of the U. S. Army by Major General H. M. Jones, Deputy, TAG. The young onlooker was not identified but it is a good bet that he is a budding scientist.



vilian training force will number about 360. Certain Army non-aviation activities also will use the base's facilities.

Aviation training at both places will be conducted by civilian contract. Army aviation tactical fixed-wing and advanced cargo-helicopter pilot training will continue at the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Field Exercises for FY 57

Seven major field exercises will be conducted during fiscal year 1957. They will involve about 84,000 troops and include divisional, mountain, jungle, and arctic orientation type exercises.

RED ARROW is scheduled for November and December at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The 1st Infantry Division and other supporting units will participate in the combined and unit training exercise.

In January and February an RCT of the 82d Airborne Division will airlift to Alaska for NORTHERN LIGHT, a training exercise in arctic operations.

The 1st Armored Division will take part in SLEDGE HAMMER at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in February and March. This exercise will feature troop tests of SKY CAV II, engineer assault equipment, and aerial resupply of armor in the exploitation phase.

RIO SELVA, scheduled for March and April in the Canal Zone, will provide field training in jungle operations and the reinforcement of the Caribbean Command from CONUS. A BCT of the 82d Airborne Division will conduct this exercise.

In April KING COLE, a CPX in the

field, will be held at Fort Polk. Involving about 26,000 troops, it will train staffs and participating units in new tactical concepts, organization, and techniques adopted by the Army, and emphasize free maneuver over great distances. Participating units: Headquarters of III Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, 1st Armored Division, 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions, 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions; the 2d Armored Cavalry; the 2d Logistical Command; and FA units (280mm, Honest John, 8-inch howitzer, and Corporal).

The 4th Infantry Division, now in Europe, will move to Fort Lewis, Washington, in time for INDIAN RIVER in May. This exercise, at Yakima, will provide combined and unit training.

COLD SPOT, a training exercise in mountain and cold-weather operations, will be held at Camp Hale, Colorado, in July and continue through the next spring. Involving about 3,500 troops of the 1st Infantry Division and 77th Special Forces Group over the extended period, COLD SPOT will provide training in mountain operations at high altitudes.

In addition to these, tactical CPXs will be conducted by army headquarters in CONUS. They will provide training for commanders and staffs in tactical, intelligence, and logistical operations under assumed conditions of extensive atomic, CBR and electronic warfare capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces. A logistical CPX, LOGEX 57, is scheduled for May at Fort Lee, Virginia, to be attended by student officers at technical and administrative schools and selected USAR officers.

Another kind of INSURANCE

Ralph D. Ritchie was selling life insurance in Panama City, Fla., when the U. S. Army recalled him from reserve status as an enlisted man at the outbreak of the Korean conflict.

In 1952, he received a direct commission in the Army's Medical Service Branch and orders which sent him to helicopter flight school.

Today, Lt. Ritchie is helping provide a new kind of insurance . . . a strong and versatile aviation unit of the Army.

With more than 1200 hours of helicopter flight time, mostly in Bell H-13s, Lt. Ritchie is now an instructor at the Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. Here, he is teaching seasoned pilots and aviation cadets helicopter tactics that apply directly to the Medical Service Branch.



L.T. RALPH D. RITCHIE
"an assist to the medics"



The Army is giving increasingly more responsibilities to its helicopter pilots. It is teaching these men to evacuate wounded, speed plasma and other supplies directly to where they are critically needed, fly in doctors, nurses and medical corpsmen. Helicopter pilots are doing dozens of different jobs for the Army . . . and doing them all well.

Helicopters need pilots and mechanics!
Apply to Army Aviation for career training!

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Douglas C-133A is designed to lift 50 tons. It will be several years before even a few of them are available.

The 'Status Quo' in Airlift

The Lockheed C-130 turbo-prop transport is now in production. It will carry up to 20 tons



THE title of this Staff Report comes from a colloquy between Senator Stuart Symington and Major General Earle G. Wheeler, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, during a session of the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. It went like this:

SENATOR SYMINGTON. General Gavin just said that we are well behind, totally inadequate with our airlift. Based on the figures you have just read, we are carefully planning to stay behind. Isn't that a fair statement?

GENERAL WHEELER. Sir, it would seem to me that we are going to remain about in the status quo, sir, which is behind.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. You know the definition of status quo General Knudsen had. He said it means "the hell of a fix we are in. . ." If the figures that you have given are correct, and presumably they are correct, we still plan to remain inadequate [in airlift for the Army]. Is not that a fair statement? . . .

GENERAL WHEELER. There is no program to correct it, sir. . . .

THIS passage came after pages of matter-of-fact testimony showing that the most striking fact about American tactical and strategic airlift today is that it barely exists. Convincing evidence was presented to show that if another bonfire flared up in Korea or elsewhere, the U.S. would be hard pressed to find airlift enough to rush even one Army division to the battle front in any reasonable length of time. And if the aggression was the signal for total war, the result would be chaotic, as the Army, Navy and Air Force each presented high-priority demands for far more strategic airlift than presently exists.

In his 1954 State of the Union message President Eisenhower said in reference to plans to withdraw some of our divisions from Korea: "Our armed forces must regain maximum mobility of action. Our strategic reserves must be centrally placed and readily deployable to meet sudden aggression against ourselves and our allies."

The creation of a strategic reserve of Army forces has followed (too slowly, some would say) the planned deployment, but "maximum mobility of action" has not been regained. The lack of airlift nullifies the progress that has

(Continued on page 55)

* **Meaning: The hell
of a fix we are in**

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Advance registration and reservations for the Second Annual Meeting of the Association of the U. S. Army will be accepted beginning 1 August 1956. To insure a square deal for all concerned and keep the administrative tail from wagging the operational dog we've set up a few ground rules which will apply:

- All requests for reservations, banquet tickets, and registration must be sent to AUSA, 1529 Eighteenth St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. They will be handled on a first-come, first-served basis.
- *Check or money order* covering the cost of registration and tickets requested *must accompany application*. Indicate billet desired but *do not* send advance payment for billet.
- Advance registration and reservations will be accepted from members only. If you are not currently a member, you can add \$5.00 to your check for 1 year's dues and be enrolled at the same time you register.
- Advance mail registrations and reservations will be confirmed by mail and your registration badge, billet reservation, and tickets may be picked up at the AUSA Registration Desk—Sheraton-Park Hotel, beginning 1200 24 October 1956.
- Members desiring hotel reservations will be accommodated at the Sheraton-Park insofar as space permits. When all rooms at the Sheraton-Park are reserved, AUSA will endeavor to obtain comparable accommodations at another Washington hotel.
- The Sheraton-Park Hotel requires presentation of *active-duty ID card*, if not in uniform, to obtain special military rates.
- If you desire a firm appointment with Career Management or an appointment to examine your 201 file please write a note accompanying your registration and reservation application indicating your desires.

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THE

BRUCE JACOBS



A free-lance writer, **Bruce Jacobs** is the author of Korea's Heroes, which was published in 1953, and *Heroes of the Army: The Medal of Honor and Its Winners*, to be published on 15 September by W. W. Norton & Co. He served in the infantry in the Pacific during the Second World War. Late in the war he became one of that small band of infantry combat correspondents and reported the infantry war from the Marianas and Okinawa. After a term on the staff of "The New York World Telegram" he became associated with a number of magazines as an editor and contributor. In 1953 he made the break as a free-lance writer, and writes from his home in Park Ridge, New Jersey. A First Lieutenant in the Army Reserve, Mr. Jacobs has served on active duty with PID, D/A. During the preparation of this article he visited Guardsmen in 14 states.

NATIONAL GUARD

OUR REALLY READY RESERVE

THE passage, a year ago, of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 (RFA 55) rekindled interest in the reserve program of a nation that had seemingly ceased to care. But the sparks had scarcely begun to sparkle when Phophets of Doom rushed into print with stories that prominent featured such words as "shocking," "frightful," "disgraceful."

There are so many people complaining about the state of our reserves that it can be wondered if anyone is left to do anything about it. The answer is that numerous persons and groups are trying very hard to do something about the reserve program, and up to this point the group that appears to be doing the most outstanding job is the Army National Guard.

That the Guard today is a ready reserve *in being*, not merely on a slip of paper, is a conclusion that is inescapable after an extensive period of looking realistically at National Guard armory and field training, after being exposed to the militant enthusiasm of hundreds of Guard officers and men, after soul-searching gab sessions with Army advisers assigned to the Guard in many sections of the country.

(Where the term "National Guard" is used in this article it generally means Army National Guard. I did not closely examine the status of the Air National Guard;

nevertheless, it appears as though the ANG is far and away the most ready element of our air reserve forces.)

State of the Guard

Today the Army National Guard stands better equipped and better manned than ever before in history to carry out its traditional mobilization missions: defend the U. S. from attack and join with the Active Army in offensive operations.

Guard strength is at an all-time high with more than 400,000 men enrolled as of the time this article was written. The Guard could point with considerable pride to its 5,268 federally recognized units, to the fact that 85.6 per cent of its officers have seen active military service.

But the story of "the state of the Guard" is not one that may be told in a mere recital of strength figures or in an examination of its troop basis. (The current troop basis of the Guard discloses a line-up of twenty-one infantry divisions, six armored divisions, three armored groups, plus assorted regimental combat teams, armored cavalry regiments, combat and combat-support battalions.) The real story of the Guard actually deals in a number of intangibles. An outsider (a non-Guardsman, that is) must necessarily marvel at the time and energy that National Guardsmen devote to their part-time calling. I once heard a general



Guard officers on a weekend CPX

officer of the Regular Army remark that Guardsmen were fanatics. It is my own opinion that there is no such thing as a lukewarm National Guard soldier. And herein, quite possibly, lies the greatest strength of this unique organization.

But the Guard is not without its problems nor is it without enemies. And in some instances, strangely enough, the worst enemies of the Guard are those who would indignantly and immediately refer to themselves as "the best friend the Guard has got."

The latter category includes those who (usually for political reasons) claim for the Guard more readiness than it can humanly be expected to achieve. It includes long-time members to whom the Guard can do no wrong, by whom any criticism of the Guard program is brushed aside in peevishness. This is, in a sense, an internal problem.

THREE is an external problem, too. It concerns the long litany of gripes (going back at least to the battle of Bladensburg in 1814) voiced by outsiders that the Guard is rotten with politics, that its officers are over-age and physically unqualified and that Guard noncoms are beardless kids; that the Guard is just a play toy of the governor; and that the Guard attracts principally individuals seeking to promote their own interests.

Despite the fact that there are ready answers to these

barbs, the questions rattle Guardsmen who are sensitive to the importance of good community relations—possibly more so than even the active Army. While it seeks to mend these fences it is far more concerned with an overriding problem, one that may be summed up in a single word. The word is *training*. Guard leaders know that in the long run the Guard will be judged not by its scrapbooks, not by its popularity—but by its ability or its failure to measure up to the requirements of the war plans of the United States Army.

Exactly what this entails was expressed by the Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, when he said, "An enemy may expect to meet them in battle shortly after he attacks."

As if to show the importance that the Army attaches to its role in readying the Guard, he also said, "If we have succeeded in giving them the vigor and combat readiness necessary . . . they should have no difficulty in discharging their combat assignments."

So, we ask, what does this mean to a field artillery battery in Ohio, to an armored cavalry regiment in West Virginia, to combat engineers in New Jersey, to Guardsmen in Texas . . . Nebraska . . . Connecticut . . . California?

This is precisely what I set out to learn when the editors of **ARMY** suggested I hit the road in an effort to find out what makes the National Guard tick—if it is ticking.

Problems and Prospects

I learned that the Guard is ticking as never before. In most places I found:

- ¶ That the Guard was getting good community support.
- ¶ That Guardsmen were not baffled by recruiting problems.
- ¶ That both armory and field training attendance was at an all-time high all over the country.
- ¶ That the Guard is getting good support from the active Army in the matter of equipment and qualified adviser personnel.
- ¶ That the Guard in its present form is considerably stronger on the local-unit level than the federally sponsored reserve and is, in fact, more fully integrated in actual defense plans than any other component of the reserve.

On the local-unit level I learned about some of the problems that vex Guardsmen.

In many places they feel that the Guard is bogged down in paperwork, that the administrative overload is far too great.

They feel that more caretakers are needed as more Guard outfits become equipped with complicated and costly machinery such as tanks, self-propelled guns, engineer vehicles.

Many are strongly resentful of inadequate, cramped training facilities in converted lofts and warehouses.

They wish that the Department of the Army would make positive statements about keeping Guard units together following a mobilization; they feel that the Department has not "kept the faith" in the past and many Guardsmen feel that this issue has hampered recruitment. This feeling largely arises out of the experience of units that were stripped after being ordered to active duty during the Korean emergency.

They wonder about some of the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 and wonder if RFA5 was designed eventually to put the Guard out of business.

A study of the National Guard inevitably invites comparison with the Army Reserve. "Compared with Army Reserve units," Scripps-Howard staff writer Albert W. Colegrove stated not long ago, "National Guard forces sparkle." And Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of *The New York Times*, who is no stranger to these columns, wrote, "The condition of the Guard is in startling contrast to the 'lean and hungry' look of the Army Reserve forces. . . ." I am inclined to agreement with these views.

There are reasons, of course. Individual reservists are no less sincere in their efforts than Guardsmen—but there is no belittling such self-evident facts as that the National Guard has the recruiting savvy, the training facilities, the background for community support. The Guard, after all, has been in business a long time.

That the Army has been putting increased reliance in the Guard rather than the Army Reserve is clearly seen in the missions that have been given the Guard in recent years. Guard antiaircraft battalions are involved in the all-important on-site program (more about this later); in critical areas units of the Guard have been integrated into actual defense plans of the Active Army. Furthermore, it is clearly significant that during a period when the force structure of the Army Reserve was reduced from twenty-two "combat type" divisions to ten, the troop basis of the Guard was revised to the extent that more divisions were converted to armor, a role that calls for stepped-up training

to meet the requirements of mechanization. The preponderance of armor in the Guard today stands in roughly the same proportion as in the Active Army. The Guard troop basis is pegged at twenty-one infantry divisions and six armored divisions; the Active Army consists of fifteen infantry and airborne divisions and four armored divisions.

Although Guard leaders at the top echelons of command profess that "there's room for both of us," when the question of the Army Reserve arises, there is less of this sentiment among the rank and file.

A Texan who was a reservist prior to World War II and who today commands a National Guard regiment, told me bluntly, "The biggest hump that the Guard has got to hurdle today is the Army Reserve."

A New Englander declared: "Of course there is serious conflict. Do you suppose we're overjoyed when they set up shop in a town where we've been doing business for years? I don't blame the Reserve—I blame the Army. Couldn't they have picked towns where there were no Guard units?"

In several areas I visited, signs of conflict were unmistakable. Guard officers, lured by the promise of quick promotions, were switching over to the Army Reserve. Army Reserve units were accused of covertly proselytizing noncommissioned officers with the promise of more rank.

At least one state adjutant has openly told his fellow Guardsmen, "Department of the Army announcements concerning reorganization of the Army Reserve will have a detrimental effect upon National Guard units unless positive action is taken now by every responsible National Guard commander."

Major General A. D. Sheppard, Adjutant General of Missouri, recently expressed the Guard point of view by observing that: "National Guard units have generally been located and fitted into their communities for many years and are identified with them by strong ties, and hundreds





Armory training is to the National Guard what parade ground drill is to the active Army

of thousands of dollars have been invested by the State in real estate and armory facilities. We cannot abandon this property; therefore we must fight for it."

"There is no reason under the sun why the Guard and the Army Reserve cannot co-exist," a Michigan National Guard officer told me. "That is, if some judicious allocation of new units is made—and that goes for the Guard as well as the Reserve. If a town has a Guard infantry company why, then, let the Army Reserve put in engineers or MPs. If the Reserve has an infantry company established, a new Guard outfit should be armor or artillery. You're going to hear griping clear down the line when the Army Reserve dumps two infantry companies into a town that has for years been hard-pressed to support one Guard infantry company."

On the basis of what I saw, the National Guard training program on the unit level leaves little room for comparison with the Reserve. This is a simple fact of life even if it hurts. Even when Guard armories are on the ramshackle side (and a surprising number of them are), you find supply rooms fully stocked with the TOE allowance of individual clothing and equipment on hand and neatly arranged; weapons racks are well stocked; there are scale models, working models and up-to-date training aids; there is much of the actual heavy equipment close at hand. These are among the reasons for the Guard's superiority in the "readiness" department.

"Because of all this," a company commander told me, "we have a real training program. We don't show ancient training films or fill the guys with war stories. I put our facilities first—that's why we have little trouble recruiting men, and less trouble maintaining a high attendance record."

Most Guardsmen feel that instruction is better now than it was after World War II and "far and away" superior to pre-World War II training. "The fact that we are getting the actual material to work with," an Ohio artilleryman explained, "makes all the difference. My boys work hard all year in anticipation of firing those big guns come summer."

Where, Guardsmen wonder, do they fit into the scheme of things in the new Reserve program?

This is an important—and vexing problem. And it is one that ties right into the Guard manpower picture.

Manpower and Training

A close examination of the Guard's manpower poses baffling aspects to what, outwardly at least, is a rosy picture. If the Guard manpower story were to be considered in terms of numbers alone, there would be scant cause for worry. At the time this was written the strength of the Army Guard was over 400,000. This represents the highest peacetime strength in the history of the Guard, and led Major General Ellard A. Walsh, President of the National Guard Association, to label as "ridiculous" the 408,100-man National Guard force ceiling imposed by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1957.

But the Guard must necessarily concern itself with an additional factor: the training of these men. It is important to keep in mind the prime mission of the Guard—to be available to fight alongside the Active Army in operations at home or overseas.

However, there are Army regulations which state that a soldier cannot be sent overseas unless he has completed four months of basic training.

By far the largest proportion of Guard soldiers, not being

required by law to undergo active duty, have not completed what can properly be considered as satisfactory basic training under the existing regulations. This situation must be remedied—quickly. As it stands at present, despite the Guard's high degree of readiness, it is doubtful whether (by strict interpretation) its divisions are POM qualified.

Among high-ranking officers of both the Active Army and the Guard this is a matter of serious concern. Not many months ago General Taylor expressed his fears that the Guard was handicapped by this "lack of basic training among the enlisted members of the Guard."

Major General Edgar C. Erickson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, has proposed to Department of Defense that two years of Guard training participation be considered the equivalent of basic training.

TH E Guard's own conviction that two years of Guard training ought to be considered a satisfactory equivalent of four months of Army basic training is getting a going-over this summer. Training committees from Continental Army Command are putting a thousand selected Guardsmen from each of the twenty-seven divisions through the paces of Army Training Test 21-2. Each Guardsman who is picked to undergo the two-day testing period will have had two years in the Guard and one summer camp behind him. The test is the one active Army soldiers undergo after they have finished the normal 16-week training period.

In order to understand fully how the Guard came to be manned largely by youngsters without prior military service, it is necessary to go back to 1949 and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. Under the broad provisions of UMT&SA, young fellows from 17 to 18½ found they had an opportunity to fulfill their military service in the Guard with an assurance of no involuntary call to active duty barring an all-out emergency. In return they were to stick with the Guard until they reached the age of 28—thus giving the Guard a considerable shot in the arm in the way of young men with what amounted to a 9-11½-year obligation.

In actual practice it has not worked out exactly that way. For one thing, many youngsters, given a small taste of military life, decided to chuck the Guard and enlist in the Regular Army. It has long been Guard policy never to deny a discharge to someone wishing to enlist in the Regulars. Others have been lost due to change of home, decision to attend an out-of-town college, or failure to maintain a satisfactory attendance record. (In the latter case a man's name is submitted to his local draft board as a candidate for induction.) At any rate, the Guard has been subjected to a fairly sizable personnel turnover from year to year. Last year, for example, it was necessary to enlist or reenlist 183,000 men to show a net increase of 50,000.

From the table at the top of the page (based upon FY 1956), it will be seen that more than 60 per cent of the enlisted strength consists of men without active duty or basic training.

Guard leaders are not blind to the problems that arise out of the business of taking in 100,000 men each year who have no prior military service and who cannot be put on active duty for training except at their own request. And all too often the young men who have joined the Guard have done so for precisely this reason. Simple economic facts of life explain that there are numerous young men who cannot be away from their civilian jobs the length of

SOURCES OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Per cent	Age	
51.2	17-18½	Not required to serve involuntarily on active duty or active duty for training.
20.8	18½-26	Not subject to draft but no prior active duty.
13.0	18½-26	Subject to draft. No prior active duty.
10.6	26	Not subject to draft. Contains many with no active duty.
4.4		Obligated reservists returned from two years of active duty who voluntarily enlisted in the Guard.

time that is needed to take Army training. Last summer an important stride in the right direction was made when the Guard got Army approval for a special eight-week training program.

Under this plan it was possible for Guard privates (E-1 and E-2) with less than one year of Guard duty to volunteer for a specially tailored eight-week basic training course. Re-extended to 31 August, 1956, the program has graduated 8,000 participants at this writing.

It was an ideal program for Guardsmen. A youngster who graduated from high school in June could complete his eight weeks of training during the summer and report to a college classroom or start in on a job in September.

The Impact of RFA 55

If this program is permitted to continue (an improbability in view of the Department of Defense emphasis upon RFA 55 and its six months of active-duty training) it would provide the Guard with a good core of trained soldiers.

Not long after the eight-week training program began, the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 became law. The chief provision of RFA 55 seemed to be the fact that a young man of 17-18½ who joined a Reserve unit and volunteered for six months of active duty for training could then return home to finish out his remaining 7½ years as a reservist.

It was some time before the legal aspects of RFA 55 were unravelled in so far as it applied to the National Guard. It seems to boil down to this:

The Guard as well as the Army Reserve could recruit men for the six-month training program.

A Guardsman who volunteered for the six-month program would reduce his military service obligation to 7½ years. That meant that a Guardsman of 17 who enlisted under RFA and took the six months of training would be finished with the obligated portion of his military service at the age of 25. Men who enlisted in the Guard but did not volunteer for the six months' training would still have to serve until the age of 28.

These were the initial considerations of the new Reserve law. The Guard could benefit under RFA 55 in direct proportion to its recruiting efforts.

The National Guard Bureau has beat the drum for RFA 55 and has urged its new men to "take six." It has advocated "six-month squads" in its companies (squads that would presumably go off to train together and then return to serve in a Guard unit). In actual numbers, around 3,500 Guards-



men had enrolled in the six-month training program as of the time this was written. In fiscal year 1957, it is hoped more than 7,750 Guardsmen will undergo RFA 55 training. "There is no question of the value of this training," says General Erickson. "It benefits both the individual, his unit, and the National Guard as a whole."

But rank-and-file Guardsmen, despite the way their leadership has dutifully marched in tune with the Department of Defense bandwagon, do not like RFA 55. They read in the fine print of the Act provisions that seem to favor the Army Reserve.

These fears are largely centered on the fact that after 1 July 1957 any soldier who finishes a two-, three- or four-year tour of active duty still has a balance of time to serve in the Reserves. When his active-duty time plus Ready Reserve service totals five, he may be placed in the Standby Reserve for the one year that remains, since after that date, men have a six-year obligation instead of the eight that is in force at present.

Since the largest number of men coming off duty will be men who took two years of active duty under the selective training law, they will have three years in the Ready Reserve ahead of them. They can join the National Guard or the Army Reserve. If they voluntarily join neither they are to be arbitrarily assigned to an Army Reserve unit. But no one can be arbitrarily assigned to the Guard because the Guard is a volunteer outfit, and proudly so, and because of the tradition that no one is ever enlisted or appointed in the Guard of any state without the approval of its governor.

THUS as the Army Reserve is to be fleshed out with possibly 12,000 trained reservists a month, the Guard will continue to enroll nearly that many men with no prior service who are not required to undergo active duty for training. On that basis, veterans like Major General Karl F. Hausauer, Commanding General of the New York National Guard, fear that Army Reserve divisions "will soon replace Guard divisions in the combat-ready category."

This feeling is so widespread that an ardent Guard supporter, the Honorable Paul C. Jones, a Missouri member of the House of Representatives, recently re-read to his col-

leagues the following passage from the Reserve Forces Act of 1952, a portion unchanged by the passage of RFA 55:

"The Congress further declares in accordance with our traditional military policy as expressed in the National Defense Act of 1916 as amended that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense of this Nation be at all times maintained and assured."

Congressman Jones declared that when the strength and effectiveness of the National Guard is jeopardized by policies that appear prejudiced in behalf of the purely federal reserve it is a detriment to the Nation's over-all reserve defense program.

The Guard, already suspecting the signs of a trend to take away its combat missions, feels that a crucial time is ahead.

Standards of Training

These are some of the Guard's fears for tomorrow. But what of today, *what of right now?* Barring a few undermanned divisions still not fully reorganized since Korea service the Guard is in fine fettle. Its officers and noncoms are experienced, and its men have in enthusiasm what they may lack in training and service.

"For the most part," says Major General Donald W. McGowan, Chief of the Army Division of the National Guard Bureau, "we accept only those men who will most certainly be available for service in the event of a mobilization. We have gone so far as to eliminate or refuse to enlist men who might, because of personal hardship or other reasons, be deferred from military service."

There is ever-increasing emphasis on "high standards" among Guard recruiters. "We can be a little more selective these days," is a common phrase throughout the states. What's more, with a high percentage of high-school men in the ranks plus its improved instructional techniques, the Guard is making good use of its drill time.

Armory and field training are conducted in accordance with the "all component" training program which provides for instruction of National Guard and Army Reserve units along the same lines as active Army units. The program is broken down into four phases: basic training, advanced individual training, basic unit training, and advanced unit training.

Owing to the Guard turnover problem there are relatively few instances where conditions will enable units to get into the advanced unit training phase.

"The average Guard outfit," says General McGowan, "will reach a level of training somewhere in the basic unit training phase."

The quality of Guard instruction usually is topnotch. Lectures are interesting, good use is made of training aids and films, and the instructors are officers and noncoms who know what they are talking about.

"If we sat around battoning the breeze or telling war stories," an Ohio first sergeant told me, "we just couldn't keep these fellows interested."

In many Guard armories you find the very latest working models and scale models for training. You find that the officers and noncoms have been to branch service schools and that the unit commander is in close touch with the director of nonresident training of the branch school.

In one armory an officer who had recently completed a course at The Artillery and Guided Missile School at Fort Sill remarked happily that when he left the School a member of the faculty assured him that the training aids he needed were always "within the range of a three-cent stamp."

Thanks to such excellent support from its branch school this go-getter battery commander has his battery up to full authorized strength. Dropping in during a Sunday multiple drill session, I found the headquarters personnel in the throes of a CPX, the gun crews were "firing" a problem, a recruit platoon was being drilled in the School of the Soldier. The battery commander, a veteran of World War II and the Korean conflict, told me his people were "at least eighty-five per cent ready" for field duty. "It wouldn't take them long to pick up the rest. And it's not just this battery. We've got one helluva battalion."

In most rural areas Guardsmen are, largely, prisoners of geography. Former servicemen cannot always find a slot in the unit for which they are best qualified. An armored outfit may recruit former engineers, quartermasters, artilerymen, and even a sailor or two. Sometimes it may even be fortunate in being able to sign up a former tanker. Thus, the training schedule must adjust to the fact that even prior-service personnel frequently need specialized schooling and prepping to become qualified in their assignments.

The same geographical limitations hamper promotion although promotion requirements for Guard officers are on the same basis as for Army Reserve officers. Where there are no vacancies in units within traveling distance of their homes Guard officers *could* be promoted right out of the Guard. If this is a little tough on Guard officers, it is probably to the advantage of the Guard whose junior officers are exposed to extended doses of troop leadership. Similarly there are many key noncoms and specialists who, because of geographical limitations, cannot move up the ladder. They are experts whose proficiency would, quite obviously, earmark them for quick advancement in time of crisis.

Guard School Program

An important part of the Guard training picture is its school program which is operated at a cost of about twelve million dollars annually, much of it for the qualification of Guardsmen who fill critical MOS positions. Right now there are roughly 77,000 TOE positions in the troop basis that are in the "critical" category; more than 35,000 such slots are filled by men who are qualified.

Attendance at Regular Army service schools accounts for nearly eighty-five per cent of the Guard's school funds. Officers who attend basic, advanced or refresher courses, and enlisted men who undergo specialized and technical courses that enable them to carry out their MOS duties; Guardsmen in army area schools, in unit schools, and enrolled in nonresident extension courses, currently total more than 76,000. At present nearly ten per cent of Guard enlisted men and around forty-five per cent of the officers are enrolled in some form of military schooling. Common sense and careful judgment are exercised by the National Guard Bureau in nominating men for school assignments. Guard officers or men cannot obtain a school slot on a flimsy pretext or because they are out of work. If a Guardsman gets a school slot it is because completion of the course will enable him to do a better job in his National Guard assignment.

For example, Guard officers employed in the AAA on-site program cannot attend the artillery fire-control system maintenance course, although this would add to their "general military knowledge." Only enlisted technicians who must do the actual work can attend the course. It is not considered essential that the officers be school-trained maintenance experts.

There was the case, not long ago, of two Guard officers, branch Signal Corps, who applied for the advanced course at The Signal School. As it turned out, the lieutenant got the advanced course, the captain was sent to the basic course.

This was decided at the National Guard Bureau level and the reasoning was sound. The captain was a former cavalryman who was new to the signal field. The lieutenant, although less experienced in the Signal Corps, was a technical expert with the Bell System and on the basis of civilian knowledge was actually qualified to undergo the advanced course of instruction.

MANY of the Guard's specialists and experts have been produced by private industry, and many Guardsmen qualify in their military occupational specialties because of the work they do in civilian life. But this obviously does not hold true in most of the troop slots in units of the combat arms. This is where the school program is so important to the Guard. In a case where an entire infantry combat team was converted to armored cavalry, within six months of the transition *all* the officers had taken a course of instruction at The Armored School.

People inevitably wonder about the strength figures of Guard outfits. Not long ago the author of a series of news-

National Guard gun crews service pieces after firing calibration rounds



paper articles, concerned with "the state of our reserves," commented worriedly upon the fact that he had seen Guard companies of fifty or sixty men. He pointed out with some concern that this was far below TOE strength.

Guard units, except in special cases, are not authorized to recruit up to full TOE strength. The Guard must, by law, operate under "authorized strength" TOEs—and the authorized strength (percentage-wise) of an armored company or an artillery battery bears no relationship to the authorized strength of, say, an infantry company.

The infantry company has a relatively low authorized strength because it requires fewer trained specialists. A Guard armored cavalry company, organized for battlefield mobility and equipped with fairly complicated machinery, is authorized to recruit 147 men. Actual TOE strength is 148.

The table below shows a comparison of authorized and TOE strength in an armored cavalry regiment.

The two facts that stand out are that it would actually require remarkably little effort to bring Guard units up to full wartime strength and the Guard has already shown that it is more than capable of meeting any recruiting assignment given to it by the Army.

A senior Army adviser with a long and distinguished



record in combat and in staff assignments told me: "You cannot help but be astonished by the Guard. Remember that this is a part-time thing for most Guardsmen. Their accomplishments—in this part of the country, at least—are remarkable."

In another place the senior Army adviser remarked, "They don't need me as an *adviser*—they're a going concern."

You Can Count on the Guard

There are a lot of people who fail to appreciate the Guard. This in itself is a subject that would fill a book. But the cold, hard facts are before us—and the conclusions are inescapable.

We live in a complex age, one that renders the old bromide of "a million men springing to arms overnight" as dead as the late and lamented horse cavalry.

Here we have all the elements of a very tidy paradox. An intelligent appraisal of what World War III should be like tells us that it cannot be fought with untrained masses of men, that our military must be competent to operate the complicated machinery of war in the arsenal of tomorrow.

To be able to do this requires time—time for training men to employ the new weapons of war.

In virtually every other war in which we have taken part we have had a time cushion—a gap between the declaration of war and the time when our forces had to move into the field in large numbers. We can count on no such time cushion in the war of tomorrow.

This is the period of our time cushion. And the importance of the Army National Guard as the principal reserve component that is ready to take its place alongside the Active Army in field operations is evident. The Guard is not an M-day outfit; it probably never will be because we will probably never have any such thing in the true meaning of the term M-day. But these words from the Gray Board's report (which also said a lot of harsh things about the National Guard system) tell why the Guard is our best "ready reserve" in being:

"The average National Guard enlisted man is young . . . he is trained for violent action, with weapons of great power, designed primarily for their high destructive qualities. . . ."

Somewhat this description suggests the sort of soldiers that a Patton or a Ridgway or a Taylor would relish leading into battle.

(This is the first of two articles on the Army National Guard)

ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT		
Unit	Authorized Strength	TOE Strength
Regimental Units		
Hq & Hq Co	122	160
Service Co	154	207
Med Det	60	77
Total	336	444
1st Battalion		
Hq & Hq Co	55	69
Co A	147	148
Co B	147	148
Co C	147	148
How Co	88	109
Tank Co	105	106
Total	689	728
2d Battalion		
Hq & Hq Co	55	69
Co D	147	148
Co E	147	148
Co F	147	148
How Co	88	109
Tank Co	105	106
Total	689	728
3d Battalion		
Hq & Hq Co	55	69
Co G	147	148
Co H	147	148
Co I	147	148
How Co	88	109
Tank Co	105	106
Total	689	728
Regimental Total	2,418	2,628
(Authorized strength is 210 less than TOE strength)		

Welcome relief for those who suffer when

Flummery Runs Rampant

Yes, indeed, folks, modern science has come up with another miracle. You no longer need to put up with that hopeless, rat-in-the-maze feeling when flummery strikes. Our new product—the Hunch System (based on the lore of ancient wise men)—is guaranteed to provide instant, painless relief. Play that hunch and get on the Hunch System today!

COLONEL ANTIPAP

FLUMMERY,¹ despite a decline in popular usage of the word itself, is more prevalent, under more disguises, than ever before. It permeates all echelons of all services, particularly the higher levels.

The rich history of military flummery remains scattered in the records of the world's military forces. No scholar has yet mined this vein in the form of a definitive study. But excellent examples abound, in chronicles of the past as well as in the paper-laden headquarters of today.

To choose at random, when Major General Leonard Wood became Chief of Staff in 1910, he found flummery rampant. A man of action, Wood knew what he wanted: a General Staff that would be useful in carrying out his policies. General Johnson Hagood, then a captain in General Wood's office, later wrote:

"General Wood found the War Department General Staff organized into a lot of committees. These committees worked by making studies and then preparing memoranda setting forth all the facts in the case, all the arguments, pro and con, and finally winding up with a recommendation. After all the members of the committee had OK'd this, it was signed by the Chief of Staff and submitted to the Secretary of War for approval. A short time after General Wood arrived, I suggested that he select at random one hundred of

these memoranda—a stack about twelve inches high, legal cap size—and predicted that none of them would bear upon any question relating to war and that no more than three of them would bear upon a question of any consequence in relation to either peace or war. He did so and found my prediction true."



To correct this situation, General Wood reorganized the General Staff into three groups, each headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff. The memorandum system was abandoned and each assistant was authorized to take direct action upon the questions at issue without recording the mental processes by which he arrived at his conclusion.

Wood's crusade against flummery in the War Department proved to be hardly more than one of those charming interludes that give variety to the mainstream of history. Bigger and better flummery has always been the overall trend.

ONE of the principal implements of flummery is the staff study. As used in the Pentagon, flummery's high temple, a staff study is a device for preserving a record of the mental processes by which a preconceived notion is elevated to the status of a foregone conclusion. The best staff studies weigh about two pounds. Their thundering platitudes and carefully selected facts support the known views of the writer's superiors, or endorse action already taken.

On any given day, hundreds of staff studies are begun, worked on, com-

¹A soft jellylike food made of flour or meal; pap; a kind of custard or blancmange; a glutinous by-product in making starch from wheat; something insipid or not worth having; humbug; trash.



pleted, redone, and dispatched to other parts of the temple. Dealing with all matters of little or no consequence, they invariably undergo a procedure known as "coordination." This spreads the responsibility, and other offices pick up good ideas to put in their staff studies.

This is basic or staff flummery only. Its subject matter forms several distinct fields of flummery. Almost all staff work falls, or can be squeezed, into three categories: personnel, fiscal, and management. To examine the substance of flummery, as against its mere outward form as staff flummery, one must dig deeper.

Personnel flummery is found in almost every activity of the military services, but the most perfect specimens appear in the workings of the Civil Service system. Let us suppose, for example, that the officer in charge of an agency has been able (and this is purest fancy) to outwit the management flummery boys; he has been authorized an increase of one in his personnel ceiling. Can he hire the man he wants for the job? Not so fast! And maybe not so at all! There is the little matter of a job sheet. And personnel classifiers must establish a grade for the job.

The job sheet, first of all, must achieve poetic flights appropriate to a minor epic. Its rhetoric must inflate the most menial aspects of the job into a portrait of majestic authority and responsibility. Then a job classifier takes over. His duty is to show that, despite all the grandeur, the job deserves a grade several notches below a level which might attract applicants capable of finding their way to the office. The officer in charge lays down a counterbarrage of heavier adjectives in a new job sheet. In reply, the job classifier exhumes old Civil Service regulations and decisions. And so the battle rages. But to any student of flummery the end is beyond doubt: the job classifier, better trained and equipped, and more firmly entrenched, has what it takes for the long pull.

FISCAL flummery is a relatively new development. Until World War II there seems to have been a touching notion that the Army is primarily an instrument of national defense, organized and operated in a manner best calculated to develop and maintain its combat readiness. Not that we always



had that kind of army, but everyone agreed we should be satisfied with nothing less. Today the military departments are required primarily to be big businesses; national defense often seems to have become an additional function, nice to have but not essential. Military activities are geared firmly to dollars. This is a very old fact, but not until recent years has it seemed that the day was near when the Army would need more accountants than riflemen.

Of the hundreds of examples of fiscal flummery, the telephone-quota system will suffice. Let's say that a commander is responsible for the execution of a diverse worldwide mission involving sums approaching a half billion dollars a year. Among the litter of directives guiding his work he gets one which limits the cost of his official telephone calls to two hundred dollars a month. There seems to be little reason for confining this type of economy to the logistical and administrative fields. The flummery may well be at work now on plans to extend the idea further. Imagine the savings in communications costs, for example, if infantry battalion commanders were allowed to call division artillery no more than twice a day.

FINALLY, we come to management flummery. Its future seems rosier of all. The other types usually confuse and delay. They rarely succeed, as management flummery often does, in bringing operations to a dead halt. The following example is only partly mythical.

Several years ago an officer was put in command of a certain weapons research and development activity. By outmaneuvering some of the best flummery in the personnel and fiscal fields, he assembled a relatively adequate organization of scientists and technicians, who developed some effective new weapons for the Army.

The commander had no reason to know that at the higher echelons a more advanced school of flummery was quietly infiltrating. Their most noticeable characteristic seemed to be a new language, which looked and sounded like English but rarely conveyed equivalent meanings. In conferences with them one heard terms like "program analyses," "work measurement norms," "functional alignment," "purpose organizations," and slogans like "Keep the expert on tap—not on top." As everyone now knows, they were management experts. These young men in gray flannel suits soon produced a hybrid tongue, combining their own language with military terminology. Thus equipped, they set about creating various management programs in the fields of military organization and operations.

Meanwhile—back at the research and development facility—our commander faced a serious crisis. Higher echelons had set some target dates even less realistic than usual; his staff had been working around the clock, and there seemed little prospect of things easing off. The commander decided that he needed a few more people. His request for four additional scientists was sent to Washington, where in due time it reached the management flummery.

Guess what he got from them. Not four scientists. What he got was a manpower survey—but not right away. First, after a month or so, he received a stack of forms and instructions for filling them out. The duties, workload, and current and recommended manning levels of each element of his organization were to be reported with almost indecent minuteness. The commander brooded for a time, then made his decision. All hands ceased work and for several days filled forms in quintuplicate.

Three months later, two young men in gray flannel suits presented themselves. For a moment, the commander thought that perhaps half his request

for scientists had been honored. He soon learned the truth: the manpower survey was about to begin.

The survey team was very efficient. In only ten days they interviewed the entire staff, meticulously recording the same information they had earlier solicited on the forms. The young men then disappeared for a month. When they showed up again they got right to the point.

"We have studied your operation thoroughly. In your administrative branch we found a splendid system of work measurement. We're happy to tell you that, based on our analysis of the workload in that branch as compared with government-wide norms, its strength should be increased from two to twelve persons. We will so recommend in our final report.

"We found a rather distressing situation in your technical branches. Evidently until this survey was initiated they had no work measurement criteria at all. We must have such data in reliable form in order to reach any sound conclusions. To be quite candid, some of your scientific personnel have been less than cooperative. For example, one individual, both on his form and in our later interview, insisted that thirty per cent of his workload could be covered as 'thinking.' Obviously this was very little help to us. As a result, with respect to these branches, we have gone ahead with a formula of our own. The conclusion—and we know this will seem to be bad news—is that in our report we will have to recommend a reduction in your technical staff from its current strength of 98 to 86.

"We know that your immediate reaction is to take sharp exception to this finding. But here are some data that may throw a new light on the whole problem. It is our plan for reorganizing your operation along 'purpose' instead of 'functional' lines. You will notice that the expanded administrative branch includes four management analysts. We estimate that they will be able to get more paperwork out of the 86 technicians than you have been getting out of the present 98. This means that although your total strength will be reduced from 100 to 86, you will actually be realizing a net gain in terms of output, at least potentially. Anyhow, our report may turn out to be somewhat academic, because our division chief has recommended that all non-administrative or-

ganizations be cut by twenty-five per cent right across the board. If this happens, your actual strength will really drop to about 75."

NO reasonable man can expect total abolition of flummery. There is a little of it in all of us, and a lot of it in some of us. Give it a chance and it will take over our minds and wills. Unfortunately, the opportunities for flummery keep multiplying. The vast and complicated organizations necessary to run modern military forces are perfect forcing houses for the flummery weed. Unless we keep plucking it out, nothing but weeds will remain.

No entirely effective weed killer exists, and no claim is made that the anti-flummery device about to be described

would otherwise be absence without leave.

Let's pretend that the Hunch System had been in effect when the commander in our management flummery case put in his bid for additional scientists. Consider the volumes of wheel-spinning that would have dropped out of the picture.

Step 1: Commander submits request for increase in authorized strength.

Step 2: Higher headquarters sends forms in preparation for subsequent manpower survey.

Step 3: Commander plays Hunch Card, stating, "I have a hunch I need four more scientists."

Step 4: Management people refer Hunch Card to their commander for decision.



will by itself bring the evil under control. It is *one* of the things that might be done. For what will become an obvious reason, let's call it the Hunch System. Here is how it would work.

Every member of the Army, including civilian employees, would be allotted an annual quota of hunches, in inverse proportion to rank. For example, the quota for privates might be fifty a year, and for the Chief of Staff, three per year.

Administration of the system would itself involve a degree of flummery, but for a noble cause. For each authorized hunch, the individual would be issued one Hunch Card. The card would contain two statements: "(1) This hunch is within my authorized quota; (2) I assume full responsibility for the consequences of this hunch."

Each person could use up his allotment of hunches as rapidly as he wishes, but once gone—no more cards until next year. Hunches could be used only on authorized matters, for which the individual has responsibility. This would rule out, for example, using a hunch to give legal color to what

Step 5: Higher commander can order survey to proceed, but only by playing one of his own precious Hunch Cards. If he does so, and the survey results in a recommendation unfavorable to the lower commander, the higher commander can approve it only by playing a *second* Hunch Card. Since, by playing the cards he becomes responsible for the success or failure of the research activity, the odds are good that he will merely initial the subordinate commander's card, thus signifying his approval of the request for four scientists.

DOES the Hunch System seem too radical to try? Actually, it is based on a very old idea, a well-tested military doctrine. There's nothing new about delegating authority commensurate with responsibility, and encouraging commanders to use their own good judgment in performing a mission. The Hunch System idea, minus the cards, has won wars for us. Maybe we don't need the cards, but the idea behind them must never be allowed to die.

**Military Security Means
Human Reliability**

**You Are a
Gatekeeper of the
Nation's Defenses**

CHAPLAIN MATTHEW H. IMRIE

IF YOU wonder why a chaplain should write about military security, the answer is simple enough. The armed forces are very much concerned with paralleling weapons reliability with human reliability. Human reliability refers to loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness and other aspects of character. You will probably admit that character is a legitimate field of interest for a chaplain—his own character and, because of the Character Guidance Program, character in general.

The armed forces' concern with character is neither a pious gesture in the chaplain's direction nor is it window dressing designed to make a favorable impression on the public. It is in the national interest.

Back in our school days, most of us either read or heard about the Great Wall of China—the most colossal fortification in history, extending 1,400 miles from the Yellow Sea in the east to the Western Provinces, a distance of that from New York City to Bismarck, N. D. In the first few years after its construction, the enemies to the north breached the Great Wall three times. This penetration was not accomplished by knocking holes in it, or climbing over it, or battering down a gate, but simply by bribing the gatekeepers. The Great Wall was no stronger than the character of the men who kept the gates. In a very real sense, we in the military establishment are the gatekeepers of our nation's defense—yes, if you will, we are gatekeepers of the defense of Western civilization. Much depends upon our reliability.

UPON my return from the Pacific in 1944, I was assigned to the Manhattan Engineer District, with station at Los Alamos. Upon reporting I was assigned a room on the second floor of a dormitory. Two doors down the hall-

Chaplain (Colonel) Matthew H. Imrie, a priest of the Episcopal Church, is Chaplain of the Field Command AFSWP at Sandia Base. During World War II he served with the 158th Infantry in the Pacific and with the Manhattan Engineer District.

way lived a young civilian, very personable, highly intelligent, well educated, a genius in the physical sciences.

Despite this young man's personableness, intelligence, education and genius in the physical sciences, he had what psychiatrists might call "a characterological defect." Seemingly, he was incapable of loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness. At any rate, he was thoroughly unreliable, because he betrayed his adopted country and he betrayed his colleagues. His name was Klaus Fuchs. An atomic traitor. Personableness, intelligence, education, genius, technical skills, competency in research—all these are necessary for the defense of our country. National security also requires human reliability. Apropos the Fuchs case, we must always remember that none of us ever has the right to place his private judgments above the letter and spirit of our nation's security regulations.

The record of the military is extraordinarily good in this field of security. Needless to say, this amazingly good record is not accidental; it is an achievement brought about by careful screening, by the loyal response of the thousands of men and women who are and who have been entrusted with classified defense information, and by the continual vigilance of our security agencies. We have heard it said that "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Certainly, eternal vigilance is the price of security.

AN EVER-PRESENT concern of the armed forces is with security violations which occur because of unguarded conversations. Personnel assigned to unclassified installations may discuss their work freely, within degrees, with family and friends. We in classified installations do not have this freedom. Security requirements forbid us to discuss classified defense information with anyone unless he is, first, cleared, and secondly, has a need to know. AR 380-5 states that "All discussions of classified defense information within the hearing of unauthorized personnel are prohibited." This prohibition applies to friends and members of our family as well as to all other unauthorized individuals.

This guarding of conversations imposes a discipline, a hardship, much more demanding than most people realize. The average man enjoys basking in the reflected importance of his professional activities. We want others to appreciate the importance of our work. Nevertheless, we who are in possession of classified defense information are denied this pleasure. Furthermore, most conversations are loaded with references to one's job, to the activities which consume the best hours of our day and week. Even so, we are not permitted to refer to classified defense information in our social conversations. Hardship or no hardship, the defense of our country demands the guarding of conversations. Incidentally, our own professional careers may stand or fall on our observance of national security regulations.

We who work in the military establishment are the gatekeepers of our nation's defense. Much depends upon our obedience to the security regulations of our nation. Our country can depend upon its weapons. An important question for each of us to ask is: "Can my country depend upon me?" Let us parallel our weapons reliability with our human reliability.

What Would the World Be Without NATO?

COLONEL JOHN E. KELLY

A GREAT many American soldiers have served under NATO's banner since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded seven years ago. In that time it has become a cornerstone of our national, foreign and military policies. But now its validity in the Atomic Age has been seriously questioned by Americans and Europeans who wonder if there is a need for NATO in view of the so-called thermonuclear stalemate, and they ask how NATO contributes to peace and security in this Atomic Age.

These and similar questions concerning NATO today have been answered. But the answers have not always been complete. Much has been said of the growth of Allied land, sea and air forces in NATO. Little has been noted of how insecure we would be today without the organization which fostered this growth. It is from this viewpoint primarily, therefore, that I would like to show how NATO plays a most vital role in the security of the North Atlantic area and the peace of the world.

General Gruenther has often said that one of the principal weaknesses of NATO lies in the general lack of knowledge and understanding about its objectives and purposes. So it is wise to clarify what we mean by NATO.

Colonel John E. Kelly, a Military Academy graduate of 1936, commanded an infantry battalion in ETO during World War II. After commanding a regiment in Korea, he was assigned as senior aide to General J. Lawton Collins. He is now Chief of Staff of the U.S. Element of the Standing Group of NATO. Colonel Kelly's previous contributions include "The Pillbox is a Tomb" (July 1945), "Shoot, Soldier, Shoot" (January 1946), and "Defense in Depth" (July 1951).

In the face of repeated Soviet aggression and subversion after World War II, most of the free countries of the North Atlantic area banded a large measure of their moral, political, and military strengths for their common security. From the military viewpoint, in my opinion, the salient sentence of the Treaty is that which states: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Thus, the countries of NATO are bound together in a mutual defensive pact and, as a result, contribute substantial economic, political and military support to this alliance. NATO, which in 1949 had little more than broad paper plans for the defense of Europe, today has substantial ground, sea and air forces trained, equipped, and ready to support the major commands which have been established. With these military forces, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and the other commanders are prepared to substantially defend their assigned areas in the event of aggression. NATO has indeed come a long way in the few short years since its birth. It has filled, and continues to fill, an important role in the defense of the United States and the rest of the free world.

THERE are weaknesses in all alliances; and it is easy enough for NATO's critics to point to weaknesses in NATO. It is true that the Icelandic Parliament has suggested that the stationing of foreign forces in Iceland should be restudied; that Greece and Turkey have had local differences of opinion, and that France has dispatched an important segment of her armed strength from Europe to North Africa. All these and other problems face NATO today



SHAPE's first commander and his chief of staff report to Congress.

"NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past. But NATO's development is not automatic: action is the test."—Eisenhower, 1 April 1952.

and similar ones will face her tomorrow. Such stresses and strains are a test of an organization and not a reason for discarding a system of collective security which has been effective. Certainly, the strength and solidarity provided by NATO should not be forgotten in the day-to-day political and economic differences of opinion within the alliance.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in the spring of this year, it was agreed that emphasis should be placed on broadening

the scope and interests of NATO outside the military field. As this program is put into effect, we may expect the alliance to grow stronger, but we will also have to prepare for additional areas of interest in which differences in economic and political viewpoints will be aired. These may lead to further stresses which, however, when overcome, will leave a stronger, more secure NATO than before.

The need for NATO is also questioned in light of the so-called nuclear stalemate which, it is said, will force peace on the world. One of the suggestions you hear is that NATO be abandoned and that security be based on a gamble—a gamble that war will never be waged again because it would be too destructive to mankind. Admittedly, this is the hope and prayer of the world—and has been for centuries. The end of war has ever been the dream of man. Yet man himself, with all his human frailties, has changed but little over the centuries. While science has quickened our pace, man's fear, greed, envy and pride still influence his deeds and his world. It may be that he is ready to abandon war as an instrument of foreign policy, but to abandon NATO because of a hope, to base political and military policy on a possibility—in essence, an abrupt reversal in the trend of history—would constitute a most serious and unwarranted gamble for all the countries of NATO. The odds are just too long.

Nor should we abandon NATO because of the opposite opinion—that the free world and the Communist world would blow each other off the face of the earth in the event of war. On the contrary! It is the mutual support NATO nations give one another that can prevent this from happening. Without the coordinated employment of planes and facilities at our disposal, the NATO community could not hope to meet Soviet air power and retaliate effectively if attacked. Without this strength which NATO provides, the Soviets could impose their will on the free world or blow it up. With this strength we have been able to restrain Soviet imperialism and prevent a world war.

BUT the reasons for supporting NATO are even broader than these purely military ones. NATO provides more than just armies, navies, and air forces to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic area; it provides moral

NATO NATIONS

Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States



and psychological strength in the face of Soviet imperialism. The strength of NATO may be attributed perhaps as much to the determination it creates as to the defensive forces pledged to it. Without NATO the will of each member nation to resist aggression would be dangerously weakened and, regardless of the so-called atomic stalemate, the free world would be susceptible to defeat in detail. This becomes readily apparent when you consider how weak the countries of NATO would be without the Treaty. How would Europe look today—without NATO? How much of Europe would be free today if NATO had not been organized?

Without the support which NATO has given to free countries, who can say whether they would have been able to withstand the pressures of Communist minorities from within or the Soviet Goliath from without? Remember that as NATO was being formed, one European country after another was falling under Communist control. It is quite conceivable that this trend would have continued, and today all of Europe might be dancing the Kremlin's tune. Certainly no one country, standing alone in Europe during the postwar years, could have resisted Soviet aggression very effectively. Combining the threat of this power with latent postwar discontent, Utopian

promises and planned unrest (fostered by local Communist parties) the Communists might well have succeeded in subverting and overthrowing free, democratic government through western Europe without recourse to Soviet arms.

Moreover, we should not forget that Communist leaders have often said that when the Soviet objectives are not attained through economic, political, psychological or other means, they are prepared to wage war to achieve their ends. Certainly, without NATO and with the United States and Canada neutral and isolated behind the false protection of two oceans, the Soviets would have felt free to apply force to complete the conquest of Europe. If NATO had not been formed, all of Europe might now constitute a huge Soviet slave-labor camp; or all of Europe—and indeed the world—might be embroiled in a war in order to prevent such a disaster. Either possibility is frightening, and we can thank NATO that we are not now writing the pages of such a history.

I DON'T believe NATO has seen its day. If NATO were dissolved, the Allies, not only in the West but throughout the world—might fall apart. Neutrals would turn openly hostile. Even many of our South and Central American neighbors would abandon us



NATO'S STANDING GROUP

Lt. Gen.
Leon W. Johnson
United States

Lt. Gen.
Jean E. Valley
France

Adm.
Sir Michael Denny
United Kingdom

THREE NATO COMMANDERS

Gen.
A. N. Gruenther
SACEUR

Gen.
Lauris Norstad
SACEUR-designate

Adm.
Jerauld Wright
SACLANT

if the unity of purpose to remain free, as exemplified by the North Atlantic Treaty, were weakened. If NATO were discarded, an important catalyst for strengthening freedom would be destroyed and, as a result, some countries, free today, would fall to Communism tomorrow. Indeed, the independent integrity, not only of free Europe but of our own Western Hemisphere, might well be lost.

With a NATO-less Europe our own position militarily *vis-à-vis* the Communist bloc would be considerably weaker too. The depth of defenses against attack on land, on the sea, or through the air would be markedly reduced. Air defense, for instance, would be considerably weakened. We know that as of today the air defense of a nation cannot be made completely impregnable. Some planes or missiles will get through. However, the greater the warning period and the greater the depth of defense, as well as the stronger and more flexible the defensive forces, the better will be the protection afforded. Without NATO, we and our allies would be shorn of a part of these vital elements of defense. Without the early warning of an attack which might be provided today by a NATO outpost, without the combined and flexible air strength of the alliance, and without air bases throughout NATO from

which to launch rapid and repeated attacks on enemy air bases, the air defense of each NATO country would be significantly weakened.

THERE is still a further aspect of a NATO-less world. Assume that the Soviets cannot gain their ends through economic and psychological warfare and, as a result, decide to take what they want by force. For a moment, just imagine the psychological problems which would face the United States if the rulers of the Kremlin addressed their military might toward NATO-less Europe alone. Without common policies reflected in a treaty binding us with the free countries of Europe, we would be free to decide which course—neutrality or war—to pursue. This very freedom of choice, however, would place us on the horns of a terrible dilemma. Would we fight to defend freedom, or would we vacillate, remain neutral, and put off the inevitable day of such a decision? Offhand, one might think that the United States would rush to the aid of her friends in western Europe. Yet, on recalling the history of American public opinion and the policy of our government at the outset of two recent world wars, I wonder if we would enter the war at once! In 1914 and again in 1939 aggressors started war in Europe and, each time,

the people of the United States initially decided to remain aloof. In a NATO-less world, the same thing could happen again. We might refuse to face the real issue—freedom or slavery—and only look at it from the viewpoint of war or peace—albeit temporary. In such circumstances, we might well choose peace and embrace neutrality.

Of course the adoption of such a policy would be tantamount to signing the death warrant for the free world, since free Europe would be sacrificed to Soviet imperialism. And I include in free Europe the British Isles. Though they might not be conquered immediately, in view of American neutrality, the collapse of western Europe, and Soviet pressure, it is doubtful if the British Isles would be able to stand long among the fast-thinning ranks of the free countries of the West.

With Europe under Communist domination the explosive situation in Africa could be exploited further by the Communists and that great undeveloped continent would surely fall like a ripe plum into the waiting Communist hands. This would follow closely on Europe's collapse, since the United States, having remained neutral in the face of Soviet aggression in Europe, could hardly be expected to make any serious effort to save Africa.

It is clear that the abandonment of

Why You Should Read—

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

By

Lt. Col. Paul M. A. Linebarger

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NATO-less Europe to Soviet aggression would mean the collapse of all the rest of the free world. An alternative would be the offer of military support to a NATO-less Europe after it is attacked. This, of course, would immediately involve us in a war with the Soviet world—a war in which our chances of success would be limited by the absence of prior common planning and allies in a relatively unprepared state.

THE loss of Europe to Soviet aggression which would surely follow, would pose another serious problem to the United States. Would we permit the Soviets to exploit the industrial capacity of western Europe in order to support their offensive and defensive operations against the United States? Or would we destroy these resources in western Europe with thermonuclear weapons? While destruction of the major centers of population of our former allies would be unpalatable, equally unacceptable would be the conversion of free Europe to Communism and its support of Soviet war efforts.

A NATO-less Europe would pose such serious problems as to be unthinkable. Without the military strength and probably without the will to defend itself, a disorganized NATO-less Europe, with some two hundred million of the most able people in the world and with an industrial output almost equal to that of the Soviet Union, would be a most appealing and attainable plum to the Kremlin. Imagine the pressure the Soviets could put on each of the countries of a NATO-less Europe. Without the support which NATO affords, the countries of free Europe would be sorely tempted to accede to Soviet demands rather than accept the destruction of their capitals and major centers of population in a hopeless war.

It is true that these countries might look to the United States for help, but why, the Soviets could justifiably reason, would we support any of the countries of free Europe after the collapse of NATO? Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, we are an unpredictable people. The Germans gambled twice and lost because they thought we would not intervene in a European war. But even if the Soviets calculated that we might intervene, they still might be tempted to risk war in order to expedite a time schedule for control of Europe. They could well take this

gamble since they could count on reaching the Atlantic before effective American intervention, and thus face the United States with a *fait accompli*. Certainly a NATO-less Europe would hardly deter Soviet aggression if force, for some inconceivable reason, proved to be the only way for the Soviet Union to gain its objectives. Just such a miscalculation on the part of the Communists could plunge us into war.

On the other hand, the existence of NATO does deter the Communists from such an adventure. When tempted today to attack free Europe, unified and strengthened by NATO, the Soviets, looking westward, see not only a coordinated military alliance prepared to meet attack on all fronts, but also the shield which the armies of NATO have erected to prevent the Communist bloc from rapidly overrunning free Europe. The Soviets realize that our Treaty obligations and the presence of United States forces in Europe would mean prompt American reaction to any military move on their part.

NATO makes free Europe better prepared to resist aggression than a NATO-less Europe would be. That is why the Soviets bend every effort to discredit and destroy NATO. The deterrence value of NATO makes it the best security we can get in this atomic age.

This is not to say that NATO is perfect even though we and our allies are spending billions of dollars to build up our defenses. The cost is great. But the price we pay in dollars, manpower and national production is cheap indeed compared to the cost in men, matériel and effort which we would have to bear in war to win an ultimate victory; and it is inconsequential compared to the destruction and misery that would be visited on the world in the event of such a war. The important point is that we have defenses tough enough to deter war and to cause the Soviets to strive by every means to discredit the organization which is the cornerstone of our combined strength. By their very actions, it is obvious that the Communist leaders are NATO's greatest admirers. They are fully aware of the strength and security which NATO provides Europe and the free world. Indeed, the success of NATO might well be measured by Communist efforts to destroy it. If they succeed, the free world will indeed have suffered a severe blow.

SURVEILLANCE PATROLLING

First Step Towards a Successful Mobile Defense

Captain George C. Horton and

Lieutenant David M. Abshire

MOBILE defense affords an enemy opportunities for many different types of attack, despite its advantages for nuclear warfare or for combat where we lack adequate numbers. The attacker may try to infiltrate adjacent areas and then overwhelm the strongpoint. He may sever communications and supply lines, destroy important installations, infiltrate supporting artillery positions, or conduct a major attack. . . .

To cope with these problems, we must have constant surveillance between strongpoints. Throughout the defense, areas of responsibility for this surveillance will be designated. Higher commanders who make these assignments must either provide the strongpoint commander with means of conducting this surveillance, or he must have it done by forces under his control.

Within the battalion's area of responsibility must be established observation posts, listening posts, roadblocks, outguards, and patrols, in order that the commander may see and hear what goes on. To facilitate extensive and continuous patrolling over the extended areas, patrol bases may be needed. But to determine the strength and quantity of such surveillance agencies, the integrity of the strongpoint must also be considered. "How much should be allocated to surveillance?" versus "How much should be maintained in the strongpoint?" is the fundamental problem. To answer this, the commander must consider the enemy situation. If the covering force is still out, rendering a major attack against the strongpoint without additional warning, perhaps even fifty per cent of the battalion could be outside the strongpoint, assisting in surveillance or other activities. Because of this dispersion, the

enemy will not know in advance where our forces intend to defend. Indeed, it would avoid offering a lucrative atomic target. In addition, this strong surveillance force will prohibit or restrict enemy attempts at raiding or ambush actions, infiltrations, or deep reconnaissances to locate the battle positions.

As an attack becomes imminent, however, the strongpoint must be strengthened at the expense of surveillance. But surveillance must still be maintained, even when the enemy fully commits himself. Plainly, if the commander is timid, and retires surveillance agencies too soon, he will be blinded, and unable to ascertain where the attacker might hit next.

The commander must take care that the size of a surveillance agency is not so great that its loss will fatally weaken his reserve. If it is so large that the commander must dispatch additional troops from the strongpoint to extricate it, piecemeal attempts at relief might result, dissipating the strongpoint to where it will be ineffective when under an attack itself.

Since the present-day battalion is not organized and equipped for reconnoitering such extensive areas, all or part of the I&R platoon can be attached to the battalion commanders. In such an event the regimental commander must depend upon attached reconnaissance units for surveillance between areas of battalion responsibility. But even with this additional intelligence and reconnaissance unit, the battalion commander's problem is not solved. For he will be dispatching far more patrols than he ever did in the position defense. Obviously, the battalion communications are entirely too few. In certain types of terrain the patrols will be operating over such wide distances that range limitations of the AN/PRC-6 and -10 radios will be a serious problem. Some patrols may be forced to rely solely on pyrotechnic signals.

Due to the magnitude of the surveillance problem, commanders will be using much smaller patrols than in the position defense. Many men from the battalion will be placed on OP duty, with great responsibility on their shoulders. Obviously, the infantryman must be much more proficient at individual day and night training and patrolling. Never before in warfare has as much initiative been demanded of the individual soldier.

It is manifestly impossible for the commander to place a tight cordon of listening posts around the outer limit of the areas of surveillance responsibility, since those areas might extend for miles. But the surveillance effort at night must be greatly increased. Unfortunately, motorized patrols operating on roads can hear little, for they make more noise than the infiltrators. The development of electronic listening devices and infrared equipment might solve this problem.

In early morning hours infiltrators can be spotted before they can camouflage and conceal themselves for the day. Indeed, the most effective observation in flatter terrain comes from aerial reconnaissance. Helicopters, with their ability to fly at low altitudes, are ideally suited for such early-morning sweep operations. Today, the number available to the division is entirely too few for such continued use on battalion level.

Truly, the problems of surveillance are manifold. Only new developments and new organizations will help produce the complete answer. But today we must understand what the battalion commander can do with the tools at hand.

Surveillance plan for Battalion Strongpoint

Using terrain near Lauterhofen, Germany (*see map*), we will here suggest a surveillance plan for the organization

of a battalion strongpoint. Initially there will be corps covering forces in front of this strongpoint, which is a forward strongpoint in the mobile defense.

The strongpoint is organized to defend against threats from any direction. Weapons are located, however, so that the heaviest fire power is concentrated to the northeast, the expected direction of attack. The terrain feature Frauen Berg—Reisels Berg is selected, rather than Dietrich Stein, because the latter necessitates too extended a defense for the perimeter.

The battalion has attached an I&R platoon, a platoon of heavy mortars, an engineer platoon, and a platoon of tanks. A battalion of artillery can furnish support. The battalion commander is responsible for the surveillance of the area within the lines marked S. The other two battalions of the regiment have organized strongpoints approximately 7,000 yards away. Those battalion commanders have been allocated similar areas of responsibility for surveillance, surrounding their strongpoints. The surveillance between these areas of responsibility of the battalion commanders is the responsibility of the regimental and division commander.


When the battalion initially occupies the strongpoint, the organization of the defense of the perimeter demands high priority. During this phase of organization, the I&R platoon must act as the eyes and ears of the strongpoint. They will occupy OPs in the expected direction of the enemy approach.

As soon as forces can be spared from preparing the battalion position, they will be dispatched as surveillance agencies. The perimeter is organized with one company in reserve, so these agencies will come from that reserve company. The organization and conduct of the area of responsibility will be the staff responsibility of the battalion S2. All these surveillance agencies will be on a surveillance radio net, reporting directly or by relay to the battalion S2.

The patrol bases are established as a source of manpower for reliefs of the nearby surveillance agencies. They also serve as radio relay stations. To operate without these bases, relieving directly from the strongpoint, would require excess movement over great distances when effecting reliefs. The bases stay out at night. They are not fighting agencies. Indeed, when enemy attack becomes imminent, they will slip back toward the strongpoint, reconstituting

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Lieutenant David M. Abshire, Infantry, USAR, graduated from the Military Academy in 1951 after service as an enlisted man. He too served in Korea, as platoon leader, company commander, and division G2 operations officer. He resigned from the Regular Army last year to study international affairs at Georgetown University. He was the author of "Reflections on the Use and Misuse of Patrols in Korea" in the July 1954 issue.



ORGANIZATION OF SURVEILLANCE AGENCIES, PATROL BASES AND OUTGUARDS

Patrol Base I (18 men/day; 18 men/night) from Company C
 Patrol Base II (30 men/day; 30 men/night) from Company C
 Patrol Base III (24 men/day; 24 men/night) from Company C.
 OP 1 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from battalion intelligence sec.
 OP 2 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from battalion intelligence sec.
 OP 3 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 4 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 5 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 6 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 7 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 8 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 OP 9 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base III
 OP 10 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base III
 OP 11 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Patrol Base III

OP 12 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Company C
 OP 13 (2 men/day; 2 men/night) from Company C
 Roadblock A (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base I
 Roadblock B (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base I
 Roadblock C (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base I
 Roadblock D (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base II
 Roadblock E (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base III
 Roadblock F (3 men/day; 3 men/night) from Patrol Base III
 Listening post, total of 20 (2 men/night) from Cos A, B, C, D
 Outguards 1 to 8 (7 men/day; 7 men/night) from Company C (Company C in reserve)

Note. If the direction of attack of the enemy is sufficiently well known, and there is no danger from other directions, some of these agencies in these latter directions can be drawn in, in advance.

the reserve when they arrive. Roadblocks, observation posts, listening posts, or other patrols in position will maintain their position much later than the patrol base, in order to provide continuous surveillance. But the base itself cannot be risked, for its force is too great. If attack is imminent, the surveillance agencies probably would be forced back to the strongpoint before a relief is necessary anyway.

To protect these bases against sudden enemy raids, they must be moved if observed by the enemy. The indirect fire support from the battalion strongpoint must be available to assist the patrol base in case of sudden attack. When enemy attack is imminent, and the enemy may be in force on the roads leading to the strongpoint, the patrol base will move across country to avoid enemy contact. Patrol routes are pre-planned, so as to avoid friendly defensive fires.

The observation posts are of two-man size. They will be relieved at least every twelve hours. These posts are different from the OPs established in position defense. Because of the wide areas to be covered, their sightings will be much fewer, and the tax on the observers much less. At night, these OPs will stay in position, to report any attempt of the enemy to move on the terrain they occupy. OPs will not engage in small-arms fire fights. The occasion may arise, however, where they can adjust indirect fire onto sighted enemy, seriously harassing him.

If enemy troops threaten their position, these OPs acting as patrols will displace, taking up successive alternate positions closer and closer to the strongpoint. They continue to keep the enemy under surveillance, adjusting fire upon him in some cases, rendering continuous reports and confirming reports from other OPs.

At night, additional two-man listening posts will supplement the observation posts near the boundary of the area of responsibility. However, in this terrain situation, the only closely knitted listening posts are near the outguards, where the distances are less. In that area some type of surveillance agency or outguard is located every several hundred yards. Enemy recon, ambush and raiding patrols at night must be prohibited from reaching the main perimeter.

Roadblocks, in this case, serve to warn and delay, rather than block for extended periods. Obstacles are set up

across the road, but the position is manned only by three men who can snipe, adjust indirect fire, and report. If the enemy tries to go through the obstacle, the snipers harass them, report the situation to S2, and adjust indirect fire. If the enemy succeeds in forcing the block, the friendly force will act as a moving patrol, staying a safe distance from the enemy force, yet reporting enemy actions as they move from successive positions.

The I&R platoon has several important tasks in this terrain situation. It is able to effect contact patrols on the boundary with surveillance forces from division and corps. It constitutes a mobile alert force, capable of being rapidly dispatched to assist other surveillance agencies or confirm reports already received. In the early morning hours, in connection with aerial reconnaissance, it can assist in sweep operations. When aviation detects enemy infiltrations or small bodies of troops by air-ground radio, the I&R patrol can be directed to the area. Patrols from I&R platoon can patrol the road net. The motorized movement must be held to a minimum, with the patrol setting up in successive positions for long periods of listening, hence minimizing the noise.

Within several hundred yards of the strongpoints, outguards of a squad or less are established. One job of these outguards is to prohibit enemy patrols from reaching the perimeter. Further, the outguards have the mission of delaying, deceiving, and disorganizing an attacking enemy. After delivering their long-range fire, they will withdraw under attack to the perimeter. Their position to the perimeter is sufficiently close that such withdrawal should not be difficult. The indirect fire weapons of the battalion must be coordinated into a fire plan, so that these threatened positions can be surrounded completely by fire within thirty seconds.

From the chart, the serious problem of communications for so many surveillance agencies becomes apparent. With the present communications of the infantry battalion, all agencies cannot have radios. In many cases, however, the sound-powered telephone can be effectively used. In all cases the surveillance agencies should have pyrotechnic signals. A code must be established to designate such messages as MAJOR ENEMY MOVEMENT DETECTED, SURROUNDED BY ENEMY, OR INFILTRATORS SIGHTED. Those agencies having limited communications also have a

motorized patrol that checks with them periodically.

Each terrain situation will have a marked influence on the surveillance plans. The type of location for listening posts, observation posts, roadblocks, motorized and air patrols, and outguards, will vary. Nevertheless, there are certain fundamentals that do apply to any surveillance patrolling:

¶ Surveillance must be maintained in the area of responsibility of each unit. It is better to risk small patrols than to lack knowledge of enemy activity.

¶ The combat effectiveness of the strongpoint must be preserved so that the strongpoint can accomplish its mission.

¶ The surveillance effort must be greatly increased during periods of darkness and limited visibility.

¶ Surveillance planning must be sufficiently multipurpose to contend with all enemy capabilities such as cross-country infantry attack, high-speed armored attack, attrition operations (raids, ambushes, minor infiltrations, and the like), and movements by-passing the strongpoint to the rear area of the regimental battle position.

¶ Both the conflicting demands of continuous surveillance and economy of force can be maintained only by employing small-sized surveillance agencies, generally of two- to three-man strength.

¶ Patrol bases must be established to furnish relief for surveillance agencies that are considerable distances from the strongpoint. Otherwise, too much energy, time, and manpower would be absorbed in relief operations. Patrol bases should avoid becoming involved in enemy action.

¶ Outguards, generally within direct-fire-support distance of the strongpoint, should delay, deceive, and disorganize the enemy. They should be protected by supporting fires that are immediately available on call.

¶ Routes of patrols must not become stereotyped. In addition, they must be coordinated with friendly forces and defensive fires.

¶ All surveillance agencies should be able to signal for indirect fire to delay, deceive, and disorganize an enemy.

¶ Greater responsibility must be placed on the ability of the individual soldier. He must become an expert in adjusting mortar and artillery fire, reporting intelligence information, scouting, and using camouflage.



Five
Four
Three
Two
One
FIRE!

MISSILE AWAY!

What happens
when a Corporal
battalion fires a
training round

Captain
Patrick W. Powers

FIVE seconds to zero. The firing crew is tense as the hot loop phone chants "Five, Four, Three, Two, One, FIRE!"

The firing panel operator jabs the red "Push-to-Fire" button. The Corporal missile hesitates for a second, then splits the desert silence with a roar from its tremendous rocket motor. Missile Away! The executive officer sighs in relief as he looks up into the flaming tailend climbing aloft.

Thus another Corporal training round streaks at thousands of miles an hour toward a pair of coordinates somewhere in New Mexico. This is the end of a service practice by one of the several Corporal battalions now in training at the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Center at Fort Bliss.

How is the Corporal fired? What is the sequence of events that prepares a missile and its associated ground equipment for firing? Let's follow a battalion to the range and watch it ready itself for action.

The remarkable Oro Grande range is located about forty miles north of Fort Bliss in New Mexico. It is part of the Army's White Sands Proving Ground facilities where all types of guided missiles are tested and fired.

The range extends for about one hundred miles to the north with a width of forty miles at the maximum. For safety purposes, each Corporal round fired is tracked by Proving Ground radars. If associated computing equipment predicts an impact off range, the missile is detonated in the air.

The firing time has been scheduled with the range control center. Liquid rocket motor propellants have been drawn from the fuel dump. Survey control has been established in the area selected by the battalion commander. The mission of the battalion is to move up to the range, prepare a missile for firing, fire the training round, and return to Bliss.

WHEN the battalion arrives in the position area it emplaces and sets up its equipment. Four specific areas mark the firing position. The launching area is the actual firing site where the propellants are transferred into the missile tanks, the warhead is attached or "mated," and several final checks are made on the missile. Adjacent to this position is the assembly and test area where the Corporal is first checked out. Some distance to the

rear is the guidance area where vans of electronic equipment will guide the missile on its trajectory to the target. The control area containing the battery control center and the battalion fire direction center is located next to the guidance equipment.

This is the position of the battalion's Firing Battery. The other battery, Headquarters and Service, is generally placed near the guidance area. Although simultaneous activity takes place in all areas, let's trace first the progress of the missile.

Missile Checkout

The Corporal arrives in the assembly and test area in a large metal container on a flatbed trailer. This huge cylindrical container is swung off the trailer onto the ground by two wreckers, and the assembly and test crew immediately erect a shop tent over it. The end of the "can" is removed, tracks are attached, and the missile rolled out of the can.

Now ready for checkout, the round is carefully prepared for the testing of the electronic and propulsion components. This is done with the aid of a large shop truck equipped with testing apparatus. Each working unit in the missile is examined and tested to see that it will function correctly in flight. The operation requires both troop-trained and school-trained specialists.

Concurrently, in the guidance vans complex electronic equipment is warmed up and checked out systematically. A detailed set of procedures is followed by the crew of each van and then a coordination or "loop" check is made between vans. At the conclusion of the loop checks the guidance area stands prepared to fire.

Launching Area

When the missile checkout is completed, a huge transport vehicle known as an "erector" picks the Corporal off the tracks and booms it over to a horizontal position for travel. The erector moves over to the launching area to the spot for transferring the rocket motor propellants to the tanks in the missile.

Now comes the most dangerous part of the entire operation. Both propellants are toxic liquids and must be handled with extreme caution. The rocket is boomed over again to a horizontal position near the ground and the fueling crew in protective suits takes command. A propellant truck

drives up, a transfer hose is attached, and the liquid flows from the large tank on the truck into the missile tank. Part of the crew mans the decontaminating hoses and rescue equipment. The transfer completed, a second propellant truck drives up and the operation is repeated.

After the warhead is attached the erector moves closer to the launcher for a final, short "compatibility" check with the remote firing controls. This insures that when the firing button is depressed the propellants will begin to burn in the rocket motor.

With the erector carefully aligned, the crew readies the launcher and booms the missile to the vertical. Using the remote control box, the erector operator lowers the missile onto the launcher. The rest of the crew connects cables and makes final adjustments and inspections with the aid of a servicing platform. The platform of this special truck can travel up and down the length of the rocket providing access to all compartments.

Control Area

Meanwhile the battalion fire direction center is busy with extensive calculations and determination of equipment settings. The fire missions received from higher headquarters require a broad scope of information. Universal Transverse Mercator coordinates are fed into electrical computers for range and azimuth computations. These provide part of the firing table data to determine the many "dial settings" that must be made on the guidance equipment and on the missile.

The battery control center tent is the command post for the entire operation. Here the progress of the preparation of the missile and of the guidance equipment is monitored. The equipment settings are forwarded to the launching and guidance areas as soon as they are received. When the Corporal is erected and final preparations completed, the commander orders all stations to stand by and prepare for the countdown to firing time.

Countdown

In order to coordinate all activities before the missile is fired, the remaining time to fire is repeated over the hot loop at fixed intervals. All areas follow a set of procedures that are designed to insure complete coordination between the ground equipment and the electronic and propulsion components aboard the missile.

A HIGH DEGREE

Each step in the preparation of a Corporal missile for firing is carefully planned in advance and is related to the steps that precede and follow it. When the Corporal is placed vertically in its launcher, final adjustments and inspections are made by

Each step is related to the next. As time grows shorter, the immediate area around the missile is cleared and the firing crew takes cover in the firing pit. Activity in the guidance area appears to be at a standstill, but inside each van operators are progressively making final checks. The commander listens closely to the action on the hot loop and receives reports on the readiness of the equipment.

As the countdown goes through "Two, One, FIRE! Missile Away!" no one relaxes. These are critical moments for the guidance area. Hours of preparation have led up to these comparatively few seconds of missile flight. Lights, oscilloscopes, and meters indicate the progress of the round on its trajectory and the effect of the signals sent to it. Operators monitor the equipment to take over manually in case of emergency. The hot loop continues to give a time count, now in "plus" times.

The missile impacts up-range in the desert. The survey crew in the target area records the exact position of impact. Before they can return the many miles to the firing position the battalion has marched back to Fort Bliss.

The complete cycle from missile checkout to firing during a Corporal service practice is necessarily a complicated and detailed process requiring a high degree of technical training. Corporal battalions at Fort Bliss, Texas, are engaged in an active training program to provide the Army with long range atomic artillery support. The Oro Grande range in New Mexico continually reverberates with the roar of these rockets as they seek their targets. These firings provide the experience and training for guided missile battalions that have taken their place in the Army's arsenal of today's weapons.

OF SKILL UNDER PRESSURE

the crew working from a boom that can be positioned anywhere along the length of the missile. While the Corporal crew is performing these last-minute adjustments, the crew at the battalion FDC is making the complex calculations required by the guidance system. When everything is in readiness the countdown begins. The whoosh and roar that follow "Missile Away!" drown out the sighs of relief of men who have been laboring under high pressure.



A Single Manager (Army)

Strategic & Logistic Plan	Computation of Program requirements	AREA OF ARMY	
		Computation & collation of requirements	Procurement contracting & administration
			

Hot Spot on the Procurement Front

Shall It Be by Single

Manager or a Service of Supply?

Colonel Donald McB. Curtis

THE Office of the Secretary of Defense was placed on an uncomfortable spot, so far as military procurement is concerned, in the summer of 1955 when the Hoover Commission on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense recommended the creation of a fourth service for procurement within the Department of Defense. Since the DOD had previously gone on record against the fourth service concept, how come it was on a spot?

It worked this way. Since 1947, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been responsible for coordinating procurement in the military departments. This responsibility had been discharged generally in three ways:

- ¶ Single service procurement, a system by which one of the three departments was assigned procurement responsibility for certain commodities for all the services.

- ¶ Joint procurement by a joint agency, such as the Armed Services Petroleum

Buys Beans for the Services

MANAGEMENT		Retail issue	Consumption
Production	Storage & wholesale issue		

Procurement Agency.

Plant cognizance, whereby one service was made responsible for all commodities purchased from designated manufacturing plants. This latter concerned the Navy and Air Force more than the Army.

ALL these systems had worked very well so far as the actual purchasing phase of the procurement activity was concerned. However, severe criticism was leveled at the military for the way it handled oyster forks, hamburger, and the transcontinental cross-shipment of tomatoes by two services. These, and similar shortcomings of the existing system, were highlighted by the report of the Hoover Commission. The report of its Task Force on Military Procurement focused attention on the storage and distribution areas of military procurement. Lack of adequate inventory control arose from the simple fact that each military department had

complete control of all items once they had been purchased. Hence, a procuring agency had no way of knowing whether it was buying something for one service that might at the same time be in the process of disposal as surplus by another.

The net result of these reports was to pose a neat dilemma to the Department of Defense. Three aspects of the problem were readily apparent:

- ¶ OSD could admit that single service procurement under its direction had not been good.
- ¶ The fourth service of supply could be created to take over this whole bothersome business of procurement.
- ¶ OSD would have to come up, and fast, with some other solution.

The acceptance of the first solution would have been unwise politically, as well as an open invitation for the enforced adoption of the second solution (enforced by Congress, that is). So let's take a look at this fourth serv-

ice problem, and how it grew like Topsy. Back in 1944 General McNarney presented to Congress a concept of a Director of Common Supply Services, to operate directly under a central office of defense. Congress seized the idea with gusto as a politically palatable panacea for procurement. And ever since, it has been nipping at the military to get one central agency in the Defense setup to handle business matters.

Many words, reams of paper, and Pentagons of sweat have been expended on the cons of the fourth service idea. Congressionally appointed or sponsored committees and commissions just as assiduously come back with the pros. Since I come, like Mark Antony, to bury Caesar, let me summarize the "fer and agin" picture in this fashion:

Claimed Advantages

- ¶ Elimination of service rivalry in procurement.

REUNIONS

5th Infantry Division. Sept. Write Lawrence F. Smith, Neffsville, Pa.

10th Armored Division. 31 Aug. to 3 Sept. Congress Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Write J. Edwin Grace, 172 Larch Road, Cambridge 38, Mass.

29th Infantry Division. Sept. Write Shirley R. Shelton, PO Box 5600, Washington, D. C.

32d Infantry Division. Sept. Write Anthony Cusmano, 16314 Carlisle Drive, Detroit 5, Mich.

34th Infantry Division. Sept. Write Junior F. Miller, Red Horse Armory, Des Moines 10, Iowa.

36th Infantry Division. 7-9 Sept. Hotel Brownwood, Brownwood, Texas. Write 36th Division Association, Box 5068, West Austin Station, Austin 31, Texas.

37th Infantry Division. Sept. Write Jack R. McGuire, 21 W. Broad St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

84th Infantry Division. 27-29 Aug. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. Write Bernard Grimm, PO Box 229, Covington, Ky.

90th Infantry Division. 9-11 November. Write Ernest L. Tutt, 4012 Windsor, Dallas, Texas.

91st Infantry Division. Sept. Write Archie Walker, Drawer 2219, Seattle 11, Wash.

100th Infantry Division. Sept. Write Thomas C. Burdett, 114 S. Main St., Taylor, Pa.

101st Airborne Division. 31 Aug. to 1 Sept. Statler Hotel, Los Angeles, Calif. Write David K. Webster, 10346 Mississippi Ave., Los Angeles 25, Cal.

104th Infantry Division. 1-2 Sept. Hotel Morrison, Chicago, Ill. Write Dr. Joseph Lynch, 5138 S. Mozart St., Chicago 32, Ill.

through the wholesale storage level, and also control of the distribution to the retail level. This very neatly meets the objections of the critics, by tucking the laggard areas of wholesale storage and distribution into the fold of centralized control.

HAVING started the single manager ball rolling in the field of subsistence last November, the Secretary of Defense in his "the time has come" letter of 31 January 1956 announced the extension of the concept into other fields of joint procurement, notably medical and petroleum supplies. It is noteworthy that these three areas have been models of efficiency under the existing joint procurement setup. Merely adding stock ownership and distribution responsibility should add to this efficient performance.

There are many bugs in the concept which will have to be worked out. However, anyone with half an ear can discover the rumblings of discontent in the services at this "new" idea. This is where the greatest danger lies. The handwriting has been on the procurement wall for more than a decade. Congress has declared itself in favor of a single organization within DOD. One Congressman has stated that they mean to get it eventually, if they have to use the single manager or the fourth service as an intermediate step. This is no idle threat. The Congressional control of the purse strings is very real. The prize example in the procurement field is the joint agency for procurement of textiles and apparel (ASTA-PA), which had a highly efficient but brief life of thirteen months. It was killed by the simple expedient of cutting off its appropriation.

The point to take to heart from all this is that joint procurement, entered into willingly and with wholehearted cooperation by the three military departments, has demonstrated that it can work well. So can the single manager concept, which is only an extension of joint procurement into the areas of storage and distribution at the wholesale level. But it will only work if the services want it to. A member of Congress has said that the success of this temporizing expedient will be gauged by the support it gets from the military departments. Rest assured that if it does not work, through subtle sabotage, we will have a fourth service rammed down our throats in very short order.

- ¶ The system could be operated by specialists, who would have the necessary longer tenure than the rotating military.
- ¶ It would free the military services from commercial-type operations.
- ¶ It would be capable of rapid expansion in war.

Claimed Disadvantages

- ¶ A civilian agency would remove the military from control over their sources of supply.
- ¶ It would merely add a fifth procurement service, since the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force would still have to be in the business for their own highly technical machines and munitions which are not common among the services.
- ¶ It would increase service rivalries for claims on priority of issues from centrally controlled stocks.
- ¶ Too much concentration of power

and money in one agency—the logistic tail would wag the combat dog.

THese are the guts of the arguments on the fourth service idea. The Department of Defense and various joint committees had repeatedly stated that the time was not ripe for a fourth service even if it was a good idea. To further defeat the second solution, the Department of Defense announced in 1953 that there would be no fourth service—period.

This left the third solution as the only way off the procurement spot. So OSD came up with the single manager concept. This is an ingenious device which is designed to meet the Congressional objections to the existing system, and without giving the apple cart more than a slight tilt. It works like this: One department is designated by OSD as the single manager for procurement of a certain type or group of commodities. Thus, in November 1955, the Army was designated as the single manager for the procurement of subsistence needs of all services. Under this concept, the Secretary of the Department is the manager. He delegates his responsibility to an executive director, of flag rank, who then gets a representative from each of the other services to help him as a sort of advisory board. The only thing this system does that wasn't done before is to give the agency charged with joint procurement the control of all stocks of that commodity group, down

Colonel Donald McB. Curtis, Artillery, was commissioned from Princeton ROTC in 1932 and integrated into the Regular Army in 1946. He was a battery commander and G4 in the 1st Infantry Division, 1940-45. A graduate of Harvard Law School (1935), he has just completed the Course at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Override Your Frustrations

J. ANTHONY PANUCH

The following is drawn from a personal letter Mr. Panuch wrote to an old friend, an Army major, who had served with him in Germany when Mr. Panuch was a special advisor to General Clay. Now a New York lawyer, Mr. Panuch held many responsi-

ble positions in the government during the war and postwar years. We believe our readers will be deeply impressed by the broad understanding he exhibits of the requirements of national security and their impact on the lives of men in uniform.

I WAS intensely interested in your report of the stock-taking which you have been making of yourself against a varied military experience.

On the point of frustration, I know of no one of your age (and many much older) with any ambition, intellectual curiosity and a driving urge for accomplishment—no matter what his profession or calling, be it the law, government, industry or in the academic field—who is not in the same boat. About the only exceptions are the people engaged in pure scientific research where there are no boundaries on the horizon of personal effort and accomplishment such as exist in other significant groupings of our collectivist society.

In my judgment I do not think you are *now* at the point where you can finally and intelligently decide that your career lies in another field. Let us assume that you were offered a post in corporate industry at three times your current Army pay. In terms of *real* income to your family and yourself you would be no better off. In terms of economic security you would be tied to a management whose tenure of office necessarily depends on a variable volume of sales.

More important, your status symbols among the managerial élite would not be comparable to those you now possess and would in no event adequately recognize your military experience. Psychologically, you would enjoy none of the solidarity and the traditional loyalties that go with the fraternity of rank and the vast reservoir of shared experiences of the military profession, which, at long last, is entering upon the deservedly élite status in our society that can no longer be denied it. In sum, you would be confronted with the task of becoming a specialist in some corporate activity at a time when the great problem in management is the curse of overspecialization, which concededly does not develop the kind of top corporate leadership which this revolutionary era requires.

ACCORDINGLY—to me—your problem does not seem to be immediate but rather one of making a long-range estimate. Though it may be heresy from the standpoint of military doctrine for me to say it, I think you have to start with a realistic reestimate of the art and science of war in the light of "modern design" politico-military techniques and dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Our global commitments are such and the power balance between ourselves

and the Sino-Soviet coalition is so precariously poised, that the odds against war are much shorter in my opinion now than at any time since 1946 when the Soviets made their play in Iran.

I do not say that the Sino-Soviets *want* war. Nobody wanted war in 1914; and Hitler neither wanted nor expected a general war when he attacked Poland in 1939. If we had fought the "accidental" Korean War to an unconditional surrender as we did in Germany, the danger of war over Quemoy, Berlin or the Middle East now would be fairly remote. However, with the Communists exploiting the United Nations to paralyze our politico-military initiative, and the neutralist tendency among some of our "allies" abetted by our misguided "One Worlders" at home, the temptation to adventurous aggression for the Sino-Soviets must be enormously potent. This is the sort of situation in which "accidental" wars occur.

Since we have forsaken "preventive war," it is our job to make sure that we have the will, the men, the concepts, and the weapons necessary to fight the kind of war that—God forbid!—may be thrust upon us at what is almost certain to be the weakest point of our strategic, tactical and logistic (to say nothing of our political) state of readiness. This is nothing that can be left to the dynamics of crisis or to the vagaries of partisan politics, and least of all to the more subtle, albeit deadlier, initiative of the neutralist moulders of public opinion here and abroad.

WHAT I am saying is that this kind of supreme decision should be systematically anticipated and prepared for by the responsible action of the professional military, acting through such statutory organs as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. There, and there alone, can the total implications of fateful decisions be responsibly evaluated at every phase of their development and against a constantly changing political, strategic and tactical picture. This is the clear legislative purpose of the Unification Act.

At your age and in the light of your past record, a good exposure to this kind of high-echelon political-military decision making, with perhaps a few side forays into the War College and the Industrial College, would broaden your base of experience and your professional horizon. You have the qualifications for that sort of billet. Why not think it over and if it appeals to you, make a try for it?

FAREWELL TO THE REPPLE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL J. DOLAN

The Atomic-Age Army will need a replacement system, but one that provides trained units rather than bewildered casualties

REMEMBER the World War II replaceable depple? While that pumping station along the replacement pipeline is still with us, it has changed considerably. Results of worldwide experience in processing replacements point to a streamlined system geared to the manpower economics of the jet-atomic age. Not that the replacement depot system will disappear, though few would mourn its passing. The fact is that the system for speeding the soldier from his ZI training unit to front-line replacement company needs overhauling.

The development of highly mobile, almost completely self-sufficient vest-pocket divisions is bound to create novel personnel resupply problems. The Atomic Age, with announcements of smaller and more powerful and swifter weapons of destruction, presents a threat of potential casualty figures which surpass those of World War II. Let's see if the present system can supply the tremendous numbers of re-

placements in the minimum time to be effective.

The World War II replaceable depple served essentially as a way station for casual replacements on the route from transport to combat unit. Soldiers arriving in ETO generally followed this pattern of movement. After initial processing in a theater depot in ComZ, replacements moved slowly but inexorably by train and truck toward the combat zone, passing through replacement depots en route. Some were siphoned into service units while others were held at training centers to retrain for combat arms. The period spent in the replacement stream varied in indirect ratio to the needs of front-line units.

But even the shortest stay in the pipeline seemed too long for those who entered the theater as casualties. By its very nature as a stopover or holding point, the replacement depot tended to become a focal point of frustration and boredom. A not uncommon affliction

acquired by pipeline personnel was combat jitters. Replacements whose morale was already badly shaken by the combined effect of a wartime crossing and the abrupt transition from the familiar sights of ZI to the atmosphere of a scene of combat were fair game for the gruesome and generally apocryphal "combat" tales of pipelined veterans returning from hospitals.

COMPOUNDING the combat jitters was the sense of personal isolation, with the last familiar tie cut and nothing in sight but new faces. The magnitude of the replacement flow was so great that the individual lost his identity. Any personal touch to replacement proceedings was utterly impossible. Casuals moved from depot to depot, pushed and hauled about in job lots. The very term to describe casualties—"combat stockage"—indicates the callousness of the proceeding.

The World War II replacement system seems to have been based on implicit belief in the accuracy of the formula $B + G = V$ (Bodies plus Guns equals Victory). The fallacy behind this reasoning is neatly stated by Major General Sir Edward Spears in his *Assignment to Catastrophe*: "Surely no one knows better [than the commander in chief] that you cannot throw packets of men at a division as you slap plaster on a wall. A military [unit] is something more than a flock or herd made up of so many bodies." Missing from the formula was that

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DEPPELLE



intangible and unmeasurable factor—*esprit*—which so often is the deciding factor in combat. When war began, individual and unit *esprit* were discarded as peacetime luxuries instead of being recognized for what they are: wartime necessities.

If a full-scale atomic war were to begin tomorrow, the present replacement depot would begin to expand into the theater army replacement system along the lines laid down in FM 101-1—that is, back to the World War II system. There are two dangers in this expansion.

First, the growing family of atomic weapons is designed specifically for use against large, profitable targets presented by "normal" replacement depots located along the Line of Communications—combat stockage depots, service stockage depots, training depots, and hospital returnee depots. And if the depots are small, well dug in, widely dispersed, and masterfully camouflaged and away from normally selected locations, there is the concomitant problem of loss of time in getting personnel forward as well as loss of control as visualized under the repple depple concept.

The second and possibly greatest drawback to the system is that it is geared to a dangerous gamble that the enemy will allow us time to establish our system and to get personnel from the Zone of the Interior in sufficient numbers and quickly enough to be effective. The repple depple system is geared to furnish replacements based on the figures in FM 101-10; but the new family of atomic weapons, at least

in the initial phase of their use, will triple and even quadruple what we have come to consider "normal" loss figures. Where we used to assess 10 per cent battle casualties per month for an infantry division, with nonbattle casualties about 8 per cent, we can now expect anywhere up to 30 to 40 per cent casualties. Not only that; but our ratio of killed to wounded, formerly figured at 1 to 4 for an infantry division, must certainly be revised upward because of the greater killing radius of atomic weapons. Although these casualty figures should drop sharply as our troops become conditioned to atomic warfare, the initial replacement problem is bound to be staggering.

Our front-line divisions will be widely dispersed, employing the most effective passive defense against atomic strikes. Regiments in turn will have battalions deployed over wide fronts. Considering the danger of loss of control and inability to quickly mass a force for effective counterattack, however, the effective optimum of dispersal

is probably reached at regimental level. The authors of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat* state that dispersion applies between units of battalion size or larger, not *within* those units. Using a deployed regiment, then, as a typical target for atomic attack, a "normal" KT yield is estimated to incapacitate one battalion or inflict medium damage on two. The survivors, even though they might come through physically unscathed, would be mental casualties, and would have to be replaced. It would be useless, however, to attempt reconstituting at least one entire battalion by using individual replacements furnished through the repple depple system.

THE solution is to remove the entire battalion from the sector and replace it with another moved up from a reserve location. Survivors of the attacked battalion would be medically evacuated where necessary and the battalion placed in a rear area where it would be refit, retrain and, when ready, take its position in a reserve area prepared to

assume the unit replacement role.

Such a system of replacement by unit would require a force of at least one replacement battalion for each division, with two additional battalions for each corps. These would have to be on hand and so located as to be readily available, but not so far forward as to be vulnerable to attacks on front-line units. They would remain under army control even though located in corps areas, thus removing from subordinate commanders the temptation to commit the battalion for missions other than the primary one. (The pressure to form independent battalions into still another line division or to attach them to a division on a semipermanent basis must also be resisted.) In the event of an enemy penetration, the army commander could release the battalions to corps, recovering them after the situation had stabilized.

These battalions could come from sources either now within the theater or from ZI. The ideal solution would be to have at least one independent battalion for each front-line division in the theater before the outbreak of hostilities. Under army control, these battalions could be rotated throughout the divisions, practicing in peacetime their primary war role. Additional peacetime missions could be given them, of course, but never to the exclusion of their essential combat mission.

THE less desirable alternative would be to place complete dependence on the capability of Military Air Transport Service to airlift all replacement battalions to the combat theater after the fighting starts. Trained battalions could be airlifted to predetermined locations in the combat zone from troop centers in the United States located well away from vulnerable ports. Once in the theater, vehicles and other heavy equipment could be picked up from theater stockpiles. It is estimated that five C-124 Globemasters would be required to move a full-strength battalion. Whether enough aircraft of this type will be available when needed is a problem undoubtedly causing headaches in the Pentagon now. General Taylor has said that the Army "does not yet have the degree of mobility on the sea or air" for atomic warfare, that there is a lack of air transportation for global movements of troops, and that its dependence on the Air Force for strategic air transport is a source of

controversy between the two services. The airlift requirement is thus recognized as a key factor in the over-all problem of gearing our manpower and resources to a modern war.

WHILE the emphasis thus far has been on the use of this system in an atomic war, it has equal promise in conventional warfare. The value of a system that will provide entire battalions to spell exhausted or understrength units in the line should be obvious. Another advantage of the new system is that it permits individual replacements to move from shipboard to units for further training back of the front lines, rather than being moved directly to units in contact with the enemy.

Although the system of replacement by battalion is essentially designed for combat units, it will not completely obviate the need for individual replacements. A system for processing individual replacements for combat as well as service and support units would still be required. But the flow of replacements would be greatly reduced. With fewer personnel to process, replacement installations could be more easily dispersed and camouflaged, and more personalized attention could be given the individual.

The proposed system does not remove the need for forming divisions in the ZI, training and shipping them to a theater in a gradual, phased build-up of theater reserves beginning some time after D-day. In fact, the present system is flexible enough to adjust to the proposed method since the latter merely adds the prompt airlifting of replacement battalions to the combat zone on a first priority in sufficient numbers to be effective—or better still, replacement battalions in sufficient numbers in the theater prior to hostilities.

The proposed system will go far toward eliminating those features which proved so pernicious in World War II, substituting for them provisions for the maintenance of both individual and unit *esprit*. One truism stands our boldly: the age of atomic warfare is not in the future; it is here. Our replacement system must be updated to recognize that fact. Slavish dependence on techniques which worked in the past provides no guarantee of their value in the future. In replacement techniques, as in combat techniques, we can't afford to prepare for World War III by relying on practices that worked in World War II.

ACH enemy situation is analogous to a jigsaw puzzle containing a number of variable forms composing a design or motif, which is probably a part of a still larger design or motif.

Military history has proved that the design or motif in each jigsaw puzzle (enemy situation) will become comprehensible, to those qualified to comprehend, if a sufficient number of the bits and pieces of information composing the variable forms are obtained and assembled (evaluated) correctly.

The great commanders in history are those who comprehended enemy situations readily and then took action to alter them, preferably by maneuver, to their own advantage. From available information each great commander possessed an intuition of enemy situations, such intuition being a gift as real and as unexplainable as is a gift for higher mathematics or delicate surgery; nevertheless, each commander maintained and depended upon an efficient combat intelligence organization.

The object of combat intelligence is to collect and to correctly assemble a sufficient number of the bits and pieces of information of each enemy situation to enable the commander to comprehend its design or motif.

TIME and experience have proved that each enemy situation normally contains seven categories of essential information and that some information in each category must be obtained and correctly assembled (evaluated) before the enemy situation can be comprehended adequately, either by intuition or by reasoning. These seven categories of *essential* information are: who the enemy is (identification, strength and equipment); what the enemy is doing; where the enemy is located; when the enemy can act next; why the enemy is who he is, where he is, and is doing what he is; terrain under enemy control; and future weather. In his "EEIs in Combat Intelligence" in *ARMY's* [May 1956] Cerebrations, Colonel Elias Carter Townsend advances the theory that, in any given tactical situation, there are two—only two—essential (necessary and indispensable) categories of information necessary to determine "enemy capabilities" or "risks": enemy location, and enemy strength.

THE INTELLIGENCE PUZZLE HAS SEVEN PIECES—

The Essential Elements of Information

Colonel James P. Abbott

(personnel and equipment); further, **ACH** experienced combat officers will

to say, such human variations have caused—and will again cause—needless combat casualties and reverses, though probably not more than those resulting from other human eccentricities or deficiencies in responsible personnel.

THREE can be no disagreement with Colonel Townsend's opinion that our combat intelligence can and should be improved. Probably one of the best and quickest ways to improve it would be to remove the more or less "poor country cousin" status given the intelligence

in so many command echelons except him as "a blood brother," though he does have the rather belief—odd to the "find 'em, fix 'em" advocates—that, since object of war (hot or cold) is to the enemy's will to fight, then ultimate of perfection in war is never the enemy into an untenable position from which he cannot extricate himself without suffering complete annihilation and, recognizing apitulates without resistance."

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assume the unit replacement role.

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THE INTELLIGENCE PUZZLE HAS SEVEN PIECES—

The Essential Elements of Information

Colonel James P. Abbott

(personnel and equipment); further, that the inclusion of all other categories or types of information in EEIs, as "essential," is illogical, unwarranted, and confusing regardless of how desirable.

Colonel Townsend's theory appears to be a dangerous oversimplification of the problem of producing adequate and timely combat intelligence in that such theory disregards the facts that:

- ¶ Terrain and weather (current and future) each materially influences or affects the plans, operations, and capabilities" of both antagonists;
- ¶ A commander is rarely, if ever, certain concerning enemy location and strength, and the higher the command echelon the more uncertain its commander is concerning large-size enemy location and strength; and
- ¶ The intelligent enemy—and the enemy should be considered to be both intelligent and competent always—mobilizes his "capabilities" to support and further his "intentions," which are to do himself the greatest good at the least cost; therefore information disclosing or tending to disclose "enemy intentions" is of the highest importance.

Colonel James P. Abbott, Armor, USAR Retired, during World War II was an overseas observer for War Department G2 and later Chief of G2 Plans and Operations for General William H. Simpson's Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Armies. After the war he continued in intelligence assignments until his disability retirement 31 December 1953.

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THREE can be no disagreement with Colonel Townsend's opinion that our combat intelligence can and should be improved. Probably one of the best and quickest ways to improve it would be to remove the more or less "poor country cousin" status given the intelligence officer in so many command echelons and accept him as "a blood brother," even though he does have the rather odd belief—odd to the "find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em" advocates—that, since the object of war (hot or cold) is to crush the enemy's will to fight, then "the ultimate of perfection in war is to maneuver the enemy into an untenable position from which he cannot extricate himself without suffering probable annihilation and, recognizing this, capitulates without resistance."

Let all responsible officers review both military history and their own combat experience before changing the long-tried and proved to be effective seven basic EEIs (Who? What? Where? When? Why? Terrain under enemy control? Future weather?) in favor of a new and untried yardstick for determining "risks" inherent in any given enemy situation.



THE MONTH'S READING

To the Members of the United States Army

GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
14 June 1956

On June 14, 1956 the United States Army celebrates the completion of 181 years of service to the nation. In that time it has engaged in 12 wars and 144 campaigns with the victorious results recorded in history.

In the course of this period, the Army has ranged in size from about 500 officers and men in June 1784 to over eight million in May 1945. Its basic weapons have varied from the flintlock and smoothbore cannon to the present complicated weapons system built around missiles and atomic explosives. Its supporting budgets have varied from \$632,804 during the first fiscal period of 1789-1791 to \$49,750,000,000 in FY 1945. Its foreign enemies have come from 14 nations found in three continents of the globe. It has fought abroad in 26 different lands.

In spite of fluctuations in size, organization and equipment, enemy and terrain, there is a common thread which runs through the history of the Army—devotion to duty and country. In every national emergency it has produced leaders capable of meeting the challenge to our national security regardless of the form in which presented.

The Army has played a decisive part not only in winning our wars but also in re-establishing the peace. Particularly after World Wars I and II, and the Korean conflict, the Army was called upon to administer vital programs of rehabilitation both in friendly and in formerly hostile lands. The same administrative and technical skills which had allowed the Army to develop our own West found ready application to the needs of war-devastated lands.

The Army justifies itself not by the record of the past, but by its performance in the present and its potentiality in the future. It is an indispensable member of the national defense team, contributing its visible, ready strength in being to the deterrence of war. Within the Army itself every component makes a vital contribution to the over-all defense mission. The men and women at home and abroad, active and reserve, in combat units and technical units, in conventional forces and in atomic forces, all combine their respective skills and specialities to give the Army the indispensable flexibility and versatility required by its combat roles and missions. It is an honor to belong to the Army and to partake of its heritage of service to country.

We Are Stronger Than We Think

WILBER M. BRUCKER
Secretary of the Army
Address, Reserve Officers Association
20 June 1956

Too many Americans react with apathy to the situation confronting us today. They fail to realize how strong Amer-

ica really is, and how much they personally can do to maintain that strength. Although it is only the part of wisdom to face frankly what we are up against, there is nothing in the picture which should sap our confidence in ourselves. Can we forget that in Korea seventy-six communist divisions were hurled into the battle with all the hideous disdain for human life characteristic of the Soviet ideology, and were fought to a standstill by twenty-two Allied divisions?

We spend far too much time thinking about the power of the Soviet, and far too little time considering the power we have here in America. Let's turn the situation around and look at it from the other side. What do the Soviets see when they look at America?

They see a tremendously mighty Nation, with a strong, dynamic economy that is a long, long way ahead of theirs. They see a Nation which has the "know how" required to make the most effective use of every scientific discovery. They see a free people joined for nearly two centuries in a spirit of unified endeavor, working with all their zeal toward the achievement of a common purpose because they believe in it—not because a dictator stands over them with the lash of terror. They see a people of indomitable courage who have risen nobly to every crisis, who have never succumbed to the thought of defeat even with the tides of war running in full flood against them. They see a Nation which is a vital part of the greatest defensive alliance ever created, an alliance which has more military power—more power of every kind—than the whole communist world; they see a Nation that has the resources—physical, spiritual, and psychological—to keep far ahead of any Soviet advance.

We have our differences and our difficulties. They do not diminish our strength and erode our spirit. They do not fester in secret and explode into bloody slaughter as do differences of opinion behind the Iron Curtain. For every difficulty we have, the Soviets have a thousand.

Impediments to Swords into Ploughshares

CLIFFORD C. FURNAS
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Address, Conference of Industrial Research
Columbia University
11 June 1956

Given ample time, most of the peaceful potentials of military developments are eventually forthcoming, but the lag in beating the swords into plowshares is usually years—if not decades. It seems quite obvious that if this transition period could be substantially shortened, the cause of peace would be greatly strengthened, both at home and abroad.

There are various roadblocks which militate against this rapid transition. The first which comes to mind is the matter of military security. Technical information which might be of aid to a possible enemy must assuredly must

be kept under wraps as long as that possibility exists. However, security systems have a great lag and inertia and some developments are kept in the secret category long after such precautions are unnecessary or meaningless.

The second roadblock is the very busyness which is usually associated with military development. Most of the important Department of Defense programs call for a schedule that varies between "rush" and "frantic." Hence, from a sense of duty, if not by contract provision, the organizations involved practically exclude themselves from giving thought or effort to the extension of developments to non-military uses. Unquestionably, this impelling demand on the part of the Military Establishment is well founded, but that need not exclude parallel efforts. As long as we are at peace there is a tremendous amount of scientific and engineering talent in industry and in research laboratories which is being applied to civilian ends.

The third barrier I would characterize as the NIH (Not Invented Here) factor on the part of industry. "If the item didn't come from within our own organization, well buttressed with our own proprietary position, it can't be any good—at least not for us." Certainly the American system does depend upon the self-contained drive of the enlightened self-interest of competitive industrial organizations. However, this state of mind easily leads to insularity and, hence, to provincialism. If this thinking dominates an organization, it tends to be self-defeating. As Mr. Charles Kettering once said, "When you close the laboratory door, you shut out a great deal more than you keep in." I firmly believe that this clutching-to-the-breast attitude of many industries does greatly slow the progress of the wider utilization of many developments.

Confidence in Nike

EDITORIAL
Cleveland Plain Dealer
30 May 1956

Out of all the interservice sound and fury over guided missiles, there at last emerges common sense. Monday the Defense Department's top civilian officials completed their examination of the Air Force's myriad complaints about Nike. They gave the weapon a clean slate on all important counts.

The verdict adds up to complete confidence in Nike's ability to perform the mission it presently is assigned: close-in defense of large industrial centers.

Phil G. Goulding of the *Plain Dealer's* Washington Bureau, witness of a series of Nike test firings in New Mexico, reacted as did most reporters who saw the demonstration. He was not entirely convinced that the damage inflicted on the "drone" targets, as evidenced by shrapnel [sic] holes, was sufficient to knock down a full-fledged jet aircraft.

This is a question no one outside the military can answer. But the impressive thing to us is that six out of eight shots scored hits. Ordinary antiaircraft fire in World War II required hundreds of rounds for a hit, much less a kill.

Thus the argument settles down to one not so much over accuracy, which the Air Force questioned, as to the effectiveness of the war head. Right now this is being vastly

improved, the Defense Department has revealed. Nike Bs are certain to have atomic war heads, because the explosion will "break up whole fleets" of enemy bombers.

What's more, it isn't going to be necessary to revamp at great cost all present Nike installations in order to accommodate Nike B or the supersecret Nike II, an anti-missile missile.

Most existing battery emplacements (already there are 18 guarding our cities) have at least one or more launchers capable of handling the very latest type. New radar controls will also handle any or all of the missile families. This answers Air Force charges.

We find the Air Force's position difficult to justify from its own experience. All through the years planes were accepted and put into production to meet anticipated needs for the moment, for every weapon logically and naturally undergoes improvement. You do with the best you have available at the time.

In essence that is the core of the Army's defense of its Nikes: What do you do if war comes today? Use what you have; unless you do there won't be any future for those "future" weapons you keep waiting for. The logic is unassailable.

We don't suppose that the eager beavers will now be either quashed or abashed. It is, nonetheless, refreshing to see calmness injected into the Nike dispute. Now let's get the installations built and *not* use them. Moscow papers please copy.

Interservice Supply

Prof. Richard S. West, Jr.
Admiral Farragut and General Butler
United States Naval Institute Proceedings
June 1956

[Major General Benjamin F.] Butler's coal shortage was due to his having supplied coal to [Flag Officer David G.] Farragut. Coal ships chartered by the Navy and dispatched on their six-weeks' voyage to Ship Island were detained en route by the Atlantic Blockading Squadron and part of their cargoes requisitioned. Before Butler's arrival Farragut had already borrowed some 400 tons of coal from the Army at Ship Island. After Butler's arrival the unforeseen delays of the sea-going squadron in getting across the deepest bar at Southwest Pass necessitated another loan of a thousand tons. General Butler sent his brother, Colonel Andrew Jackson Butler, to Havana to procure coal through the American consul. To Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Fox the Flag Officer wrote on April 7, "But for the Army we should not have been able to get our ships over the bar," and again on the 8th, "General Butler has assured us that we shall not want coal as he has 1700 tons. . . .

In his autobiography General Butler relates that Farragut, while delighted to get the coal, was puzzled by Butler's unorthodox procedure. "But," said the naval commander, "how can you in the army let the navy have the coal? Your army regulations are against it, are they not?"

"I never read the army regulations," quipped Butler, "and what is more I shan't. . . . If the navy uses the coal for the benefit of the government, I, as a lawyer, know that the government will never get the pay for it out of me."

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATIONS

Myopia Amalgamated

In the country of Acirema the Bureau of the Army (BOTA) recommended mobilization and motorization to meet the Aggressor threat. Department of Offense approved. The country's economy could not support the diversion of heavy industry to Offense, so the high planners decided to use light industry, whose chief product was a two-man motor scooter (popularly called Jusks) turned out by the Junta United Support Kompani. Everyone drove a Jusk. Window-washers drove them to work, teen-agers drag-raced them. Simple to operate but a bit over-engineered and quite complicated (particularly the underdrive), they were difficult to maintain. Only a trained and certified Jusk mechanic could keep people jusking. Eventually the world market was sated with Jusks, but the demand for able mechanics went unfilled.

Only Acirema Mechanics Amalgamated (AMA) trained and certified a Jusk mechanic, who could carry a union card only if he had attended the Institute run by AMA which made sure that the number of its graduates never met the demand. Thus, high wage scales and constant demands for certified mechanics were created and protected.

BOTA outlined its plans for a number of unarmored divisions and to use brown-painted Jusks to motorize everyone in them. Here was the ideal vehicle: light, fast, well engineered, field-tested, easy to operate. The initial procurement of 15,000 was a shot in the arm for Acirema's light industry. Labor unions cheered the mobilizing, motorizing Army. But AMA didn't, for the sudden call for uniformed mechanics for service was great. A veritable tug of war developed between Jusk service stations and Motors Branch of BOTA. The certified mechanics were offered handsome pay checks as civilians, but Acirema's army could offer only brown coveralls.

The contest was contemplated by AMA, which brought pressure upon Motors Branch to insure that uniformed mechanics did not accept low-

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ered pay scales when called to arms—pardon, wrenches.

Motors Branch was in a flap. A policy must be established, and this called for a staff study. Both were completed by a joint board of representatives from BOTA, Motors Branch, Men's Branch (coordinating procurement of men), Pay Branch and, of course, a wheel from Acirema Mechanics Amalgamated. The plan went something like this.

Initial enlistment would be at the third enlisted grade, with promotion to E-4 after six months. After promotion to E-4, all Jusk mechanics would have doubled pay in grade. (Example: E-4 base pay is \$250; mechanics, Jusk, E-4, receive \$500 base.) Promotion to next enlisted grade each four months, with normal time in grade minimum at twelve months. A mechanic would have the right to elect service in the Royal Acirema Army (RAA). If he exercised his option, he would get \$100 a month bonus, could retire in ten years with full pay during retirement.

The Director of AMA approved this system in a statement to the press. He felt certain that Jusk mechanics would now seek service because at each rank they would be promoted three times as fast as other soldiers and get at least twice as much pay a month. They could retire in one third the time required for other soldiers (BOTA requires thirty years) and earn as much for retiring as for staying in.

The program was much discussed in high places and in low. When it went into effect Morale Research Branch of BOTA noted reactions. First, Jusk mechanics were not particularly happy with the program which helped them

so much. They really didn't make enough money in the service while their civilian counterparts made loads more at Jusk stations. Their extra rank allowed skipping KP, but to no avail. Within two years they'd all be the highest enlisted grade, and there were only a few commissioned mechanic slots. You can't pull this date-of-rank thing forever.

Also, the rest of the Acirema Army, though not all RAA, far outnumbered the mechanics. The simple logic to this system escaped them and there was grumbling. "Why can't mechanics be drafted?" "Why should mechanics rank me? They're supposed to keep my scooter running, that's all!"

For another thing, BOTA, although pressed by AMA, recognized its expedient myopia and wished (not publicly, of course) that former personnel policies had prevailed. And increasing Jusk mechanic effort was being diverted to dependents' Jusk maintenance.

In a hundred years the Jusk mechanic problem will join another in oblivion. The big question is: why nurture its partner?

CAPT. JAMES A. HERBERT

Combine the Reserve and Guard

To put it bluntly, we need only one Reserve. Right now both the Reserve and the National Guard compete for the same man. The result is that there is very little cooperation and very little accomplished in the way of training. If you want to spend a hectic couple of hours, try explaining the Reserve Act, and the difference between the Army Reserve and the National Guard, to an eighteen-year-old and his parents.

To solve the problem I suggest that we combine the Reserve and the National Guard into a National Army Reserve. We can keep present National Guard unit designations and histories, along with other traditions. Combine all physical plants and facilities. Fill every command position, and sergeant major and first sergeant slots with members of the Active Army. Have an officer detailed as commander in the event a unit is needed for civil-disturbance duty. Put every officer in the

geographical area, whether it be one or thirty, on an attached basis to this Reserve unit for training. Such a program will eliminate the present competition and insure a trained reserve which we certainly do not have.

Much could be written in detail, but this should serve to arouse the politicians. If it does, then splendid. What we really need is interest to attain the goal of one Reserve.

L.T. COL. KEY N. SAVE

Control, Not Tactics

A SIXTH-GRADER in a rock fight can do the figuring a platoon leader must do in an attack. The platoon either fires or maneuvers, or it fires and maneuvers. Your orders and the terrain tell you which you do. The platoon leader's real problem is control.

One of our most respected generals thus described a regimental school he had run: "The class was set up as a panel discussion on platoon attack tactics. Every officer in the regiment who had led a platoon in combat was a member of the panel. In the middle of the discussion a strange thing happened. The panel members quit talking tactics and started talking control. It seemed that every man who had led a platoon attack in combat had had the same experience; their problem was control, not tactics."

That hits the nail on the head. In Korea and in maneuvers in the States and in Europe I found the same thing, and so has everyone else if they stop to consider. The platoon leader's problem in attack is to get the word to his men as to what he wants done, and to be sure they do it.

The Army has failed to solve the platoon's control problem. And as with every failure, this one has had its price.

I think most platoon leaders under fire have had to move from man to man to tell each what to do. I was fortunate to have been hit only once, and then lightly. Once in my platoon (and I've seen it happen in others) one part shot up another because of lack of control. It's an awful feeling to see this about to occur and be helpless to stop it. Some men get lost. Some malinger. The attack fails when poor control lets what started as a platoon attack end as an assault by a few men.

A friend of mine was killed leading a platoon attack on a Korean hill. His heroism earned a posthumous DSC. But the control measures he had not

been taught allowed his platoon to straggle so badly that he was the only man to reach the objective!

The manuals tell about phase lines, magnetic azimuths, arm-and-hand signals, and other things. To the attacking platoon they're so much hogwash. The man under fire is too excited to recall the complex control measures we teach.

Ask ten lieutenants at random to demonstrate the arm-and-hand signal for FIRE FASTER. None of the ten I tested could remember it. How can we expect soldiers to remember in the heat of battle what their lieutenants can't remember in garrison?

I admit that intermediate objectives which can be pointed out on the ground, and the simple, unmistakable arm-and-hand signals like those for FOLLOW ME, HALT, and LOOK IN THIS DIRECTION, have value as control measures. But two systems of such limited flexibility are unsatisfactory.

A complete reevaluation of control measures for the rifle platoon is needed. Time and thought must be spent in exchanging ideas.

THE MONTH'S CEREBRATORS

Capt. James A. Herbert, *Infantry*, a 1945 USMA graduate, served in Japan with the 25th Infantry and 11th Airborne Divisions. Subsequent tours were at Fort Benning, in Korea with the 24th Division, at Eglin AFB with the Ranger Department of TIS, IOAC at Benning, and instructor at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. After graduating from CGSC he is on his way to Alaska with the 23d Infantry.

Lt. Col. Key N. Save is the pseudonym of an Artilleryman who is on duty with the civilian components.

Capt. John F. Forrest, *Infantry*, served with the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea and then with the 8th, 28th and 5th Divisions, mostly in command and S3 positions. He is a 1949 West Point graduate, and has completed the basic courses at Fort Benning and Fort Knox, and the Airborne course. He is assigned to the G1 Division of USAREUR Headquarters.

Colonel Thoughtful is the pseudonym of an Armor officer now on the retired list.

In my opinion, additional training in the present systems is not the solution. We need new control measures that are simply understood and transmitted, and that can be memorized like football plays.

I'll kick off with a few plays I've seen work, in the hope that others will grab the ball and come back with some more.

The lead elements of a rifle platoon are moving down the attack zone when they draw enemy fire. The platoon leader looks at the ground and holds up two fingers. The signal is relayed back. Things start happening—fast. The weapons squad closes on the lead squad to form a base of fire under the platoon sergeant. The other two squads start to the right along a covered route where they are intercepted by the platoon leader. No time-wasting conference is held. The platoon leader leads these squads on to the enemy along the route he spotted when he first looked at the ground. Before the enemy can react to relay contact reports, he is overrun. Baloney tactics and million-dollar control have paid off. This platoon's system is so simple that it worked.

Three plays had been drilled into the platoon by its leader. One finger means "Close on the lead elements and form a base of fire." Two fingers means the weapons squad is to close on the lead squad and form a base of fire while the other squads move to the right under available cover. Three fingers means the same play, but to the left.

Practice in these plays made them automatic. A simple signal was given and relayed; reflexes did the rest.

Such a system won't cover every situation, and is not meant to. The operation order still has to be used at the start of the mission. This system does give speed and control, and it worked when tried under proper conditions.

Another platoon used a variant. When the lead squad drew fire, it automatically became the base of fire. A flare to the right or left started the rest of the platoon moving in the direction the platoon leader wanted.

We are familiar with General Patton's dictum that troops are like a string of cooked spaghetti: they can't be pushed into combat, but must be pulled. At the platoon level both pushing and pulling are needed. A well-known and little-used control measure

is to have one man follow the attacking platoon to keep every man moving, and moving in the right direction. This man shouldn't be the platoon leader; he's a puller. The platoon sergeant is a good man for the pusher job.

In darkness, in fog, or any other time when you can't see, control becomes all-important. Tactics really go to the bottom of the garbage can. The simplest workable plan must be adopted. Keeping people together and moving is the main headache. Keeping closed up is essential. White markers on backs of helmets, packs, or belts are an aid. One man can hold onto the belt of another. In three different platoons I've seen ropes used in night attacks. The men were actually tied together—and it worked.

I don't presume that I have the answer to the control problem. No great principles are revealed here. There are, however, five rules that are basic to good control:

- ¶ Keep the plan simple.
- ¶ Use the chain of command.
- ¶ Followers must look to leaders for instructions. Leaders can't waste time running down subordinates.
- ¶ Orders must be passed from man to man. The best signal is worthless if seen only by the men in sight of the platoon leader.
- ¶ Control must be practiced until it becomes automatic. If you expect a man to think under fire you are expecting too much.

Surely there must be other methods that will work. Harassed platoon leaders have found an answer to the problem before, or we couldn't have won our wars. Let's get these ideas into the open where everyone can learn from them.

In Korea, at a time when we were out of the line, a respected ex-platoon sergeant of mine came up with a gem on what training should be done in the rear area: "Lieutenant, a man's either gonna fight or chicken out when he reaches the objective. There's not much you can do about that now. The best thing you can do for the rifle platoon is to help get as many fighters to the objective as you can."

CAPTAIN JOHN F. FORREST

Should We Have Early Supper?

DOES early supper contribute to disciplinary problems and off-post automobile accidents? The question is

worth some thought, but can't be answered statistically until and unless a late-supper program is tried over a reasonable period.

Our Army serves an early breakfast, dinner at about 1200 hours during a short rest period, and supper at about 1700. The practice goes back to pre-automobile days when most posts were some distance from civilian communities of size.

Today's early supper provides off-duty soldiers—most of whom are at the high insurance-risk age—with six or more hours before midnight to get into off-post difficulty of some kind.

Many foreign armies in peacetime serve breakfast at about 0800, following one or two hours of training; dinner at about 1300, during a two- or three-hour break (when the soldier draws or turns in laundry or equipment, takes care of personal affairs or does bunk fatigue); supper is at about 2000 hours.

The consensus among high-ranking officers points up these facts:

- ¶ A late breakfast pleases soldiers because it affords a break in training.
- ¶ The long midday rest period benefits their health, particularly that of very young soldiers who have not attained full growth. It saves valuable training time when this period is used to turn in and draw equipment. It provides ample daylight time for a soldier to attend to personal affairs.
- ¶ A late supper allows after-dark training during many months of the year. After a late supper a soldier is less inclined and has less time to go very far from his station. The result is that he'll go to bed early and thus improve his health and general discipline, not to mention the effect on his wallet.

Because off-post incidents and accidents are admitted to be a major and long-continuing problem to the Army, why not face the fact that early supper merely increases the opportunities for such incidents and accidents to occur, and therefore is a contributing factor?

COLONEL THOUGHTFUL

Index to Volume 6

This is the first number of Volume 7. If you want a copy of the index to Volume 6 (August 1955 to July 1956), now being prepared, drop a card to the Circulation Manager. Better yet, have your name placed on the list to receive the index each year.

The Month's Mail

(Continued from page 9)

roads, or pipelines from which to receive logistical support.

I do not intend to convey the idea that the engineers alone can win a war—that would border on idiocy. However, when one thinks of mobility, he must not neglect the engineer. I will always remember Sergeant Baker's cartoon showing an entire division lined up on a mountain road following Sad Sack with his mine detector. The moral of the cartoon is that an army is only as mobile as its engineers can make it by the removal of obstacles and construction of support facilities. If you diminish your engineer capability, you diminish your mobility.

CAPT. W. H. KASTNER
Waterways Exp Sta
Vicksburg, Miss.

New York and the Camerons

• The British battalion now serving in Korea under U.S. command is the 79th Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders. This regiment is connected with the North American contingent through the two Canadian regiments affiliated with it, the QOCH of Canada and the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. It is possible, however, that there is a very much closer link between the 79th and the U.S. Army, for one of the Volunteer regiments that fought in the Civil War was the 79th New York. When this regiment mobilized, its uniform was the Cameron kilt and trews, apparently the same uniform as the Cameron Highlanders.

I am a British officer who has been fortunate enough to visit the USA. Not only did I meet with much kindness and make friends, but I learned that many Americans have a very genuine interest in my country and its ways.

Because of these sentiments and the honor this magazine has already paid to me by publishing an article on how tradition can strengthen the bonds between us, I and my regiment would very much like to know more about the 79th New York Volunteers. How did the number, the uniform and the tartan originate? Does there exist today any unit which has descended from this regiment? Can anyone tell us, also, something of the U.S. 2d Artillery? Does it still exist and could a bond be reestablished here?

Should anyone be kind enough to supply answers, would he please write to: Commanding Officer, The Regimental Depot, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, Cameron Barracks, Inverness, Scotland? The people there will get in touch with me and would be in a position to give an official reply to any question concerning the revival of the affiliation.

MAJOR N. C. BAIRD
1st Bn, QOCH
Korea

ARMY

The 'Status Quo' in Airlift

(Continued from page 16)

been made by the Army. This country today is in the foolish position of a municipality whose city council voted money for the hiring and training of firemen, the building of fire stations and the purchase of fire-fighting equipment, but which, in a wild and fantastic splurge of economy, refused to buy engines for the fire trucks on the grounds that the city's garbage trucks could rush to the fire station and tow the equipment to the fire when the siren sounded.

For many years the Army has pursued the avowed objective of making its divisions air-transportable. The reorganized 101st Airborne Division will come closest to this objective. But in view of the shortage of air transport, and the lack of a program to remedy the deficiencies, it can be wondered if this air-transportable objective makes much sense.

General Wheeler revealed that the Army has worked out two airlift packages, one for a division lift of 5,000 tons and the other for a division lift of 11,000 tons. The smaller force is designed to be lifted to areas where the U.S. already has operating logistical facilities. It consists primarily of combat units.

The larger, 11,000-ton "division force" is designed for areas where the U.S. does not have logistical facilities. This force has certain technical units in addition to the combat echelons, additional equipment, and supplies for six days.

General Wheeler said that the Army and the Air Force had worked out a plan for moving the 5,000-ton division to various areas of the world. This, he said, would require the use of practically "the whole of the available Air Force transport capability."

The problem of moving the 11,000-ton division is under "joint study."

In concluding his presentation, General Wheeler raised a number of questions and finished by saying, "I am sure we all agree that our national security and commitments require early solutions to these problems."

This didn't seem to sit well with Senator Symington. "What do you think we called these hearings for?" was his riposte.

He then said that after four years of service in the Senate and five years in the Pentagon, "I still do not know the Army's requirements for airlift."

When General Wheeler explained that the Army does not deal in the number of aircraft but expresses its requirements to the Air Force in terms of divisions and combat teams to be airlifted, Mr. Symington broke in and this dialogue followed:

SENATOR SYMINGTON. It is hard for me to follow that. . . . Let me just try to present it another way. SAC is a customer of the Air Force for lift. It is a command of the Air Force. . . . SAC's lift is SAC's lift and it is held for SAC.

GENERAL WHEELER. That is right, sir.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. Now is there any lift that you have that is Army lift; or are you just in a pool, hoping to grab as much as you can if the gong rings?

GENERAL WHEELER. Sir, you stated earlier the correct

thing. We are strictly customers. In other words, we have no lift which is available to us 100 per cent of the time. We ask by stating the requirements to the Air Force for what we need.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. Suppose, if the gong rings, the lift is not available to the Army. Who is responsible for that?

GENERAL WHEELER. Then, sir, it becomes a matter of priority of allocation to be made by the Department of Defense [which] must choose among the many requirements for airlift and assign the available airlift. . . .

SENATOR SYMINGTON. In an effort to be constructive, what you are saying is you really don't know where you stand on airlift, do you?

GENERAL WHEELER. That is correct, sir, except if I may extend that a little bit, it is my personal opinion that the Army needs more airlift.

SHORTLY after this exchange, Lieutenant General James M. Gavin stated Army requirements in such a way as to clear the air. His testimony follows:

GENERAL GAVIN. . . . The Army in my personal opinion has as a very minimum the need for a capability to lift one division in each of our major theaters of interest.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. Simultaneously?

GENERAL GAVIN. Yes, sir; I will say so and I will explain why. (Deletion here by Department of Defense Security officer. In the remainder of this transcript the appearance of this symbol ♦ will indicate a security deletion. —THE EDITOR.)

In the European area today are available the most immediately available reserves to reinforce the Middle East and deal with any serious situations that may develop in that area. Now this is not theoretical, it is quite real.

I have commanded troops in Europe within the past several years and these problems have come up and they are a matter of daily planning in that area.

One must be able to move a balanced team. We do not want to go through the experience of Korea again where we sent two rifle companies and a battery of artillery to meet I do not know how many North Korean divisions. Estimates vary from 4 to 6. . . .

SENATOR SYMINGTON. And how many did we send to meet them?

GENERAL GAVIN. We sent a task force of two rifle companies, one battery of artillery, which totaled about 550 men.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. What you are saying is that because of lack of lift, we sent 550 men to fight 60,000 Communists.

GENERAL GAVIN. That is right, sir, we did. We had to do it.

Now then, we have troops in the European area, and they must have air mobility. They must have air mobility to be able to respond to the demands of national policy to reinforce our allies or carry out any operations deemed necessary in the Middle East, in the eastern Mediterranean area.

Now this lift would not always be flying troops. Actually that would really vitalize our LOC. ♦ . . . we would be able, with such a lift, to develop a modern air line of

communications. It would have many worthwhile by-products, a reduction of sizable stockpiles in the European area, development of electronic means of requisitioning and thus reduce stockpiles at home as well. . . .

To put troops now into an operational area and deny them mobility is much the same as putting a policeman on the street corner but tying him to a fireplug.

If he cannot go anywhere he really can't do anything except shoot the weapons in his hands at the range of those. He must be able to move. The evident lack of mobility on his part invites aggression at once because it is realized he cannot move to the scene of trouble.

So mobility is the very essence in this day and age of getting about. Furthermore, and this applies to all theaters, mobility just about multiplies what you have.

You multiply what you have by mobility and the product of these gives you your effectiveness at any area around the periphery.

So mobility compares with firepower. And while we talk so much about firepower such as atomics, mobility is very much part of the equation in our favor. We have got to have good mobility if we are going to use these weapons we have.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. In other words, firepower really means nothing unless you have mobile capacity to deliver it?

GENERAL GAVIN. Exactly, sir, this is quite true.

Now, then, to return to the North American Continent area, we have in the North American Continent now a Western Hemisphere Reserve. This organization sent a battalion of parachutists to Greenland this past winter where they jumped in conditions of 40 below, they had very light casualties, some seven casualties, and did a splendid job.

An ability to do this sort of thing at once makes evident to any aggressor that even in a temporary seizure of areas in the Greenland-Iceland area one cannot get away with this sort of thing.

Of course, while we look to the northeastern area as being of tremendous importance to us, as for example missiles sites and the like of that, we also have the northwestern area, the Alaskan area which must be held. ♦

A divisional lift in the United States in my opinion is really minimum. This is rock bottom and of course it could be used in the United States for training too and for moving supplies and so on.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. That is one division of lift in the United States?

GENERAL GAVIN. Yes, sir; and it is a minimum in my opinion.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. I have always thought you are right on this.

One high defense official stated the American people just won't want to see a lot of airlift lying around, sitting around.

There are a lot of American people, in high places, who apparently don't want to see a lot of B-52's lying around. It is just a case of whether or not you want to pay for what you need if you have to fight, in order to fight the best you can with the right equipment. ♦ . . .

GENERAL GAVIN. That is right. Now in the far eastern

area . . . because of the span of water . . . one is struck by the need to move rapidly by air. It is almost meaningless to talk about 30 days later one will get there in this day and age. You must move by air. . . .

SENATOR SYMINGTON. If I follow you, what you mean is you could not move by sea without endangering the loss of the battle before you got there.

GENERAL GAVIN. That is correct. That is what I am saying. ♦

It may not all be in one area, but that order of magnitude lift is required to meet our problems extending from the Japanese area down to the Philippines-Thailand area.

Now these are in my opinion the minimum requirements, and any above and beyond those are in pipelines, in training and the like, but those should be ready operationally. ♦

Now, sir, these are just tactical. And these merely deal with the problems in these geographic areas, and solving these is just the first step in dealing with peripheral actions.

You must reinforce at once and here is where we really need strategic lift, and I would again be of the opinion that we must be able to reinforce in each major theater simultaneously, at the outset. ♦

Now this would be the overseas LOC, line of supply really, whereas the other smaller plan would be the theater supply.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. To the best of my knowledge the Air Force has never claimed they could lift and properly support overseas more than a single division.

GENERAL GAVIN. I think they would have great difficulty doing this. I do know that—

* * *

SENATOR SYMINGTON. What you have really told us this afternoon is that your airlift picture is totally and completely inadequate to do the job, based on what you think you have to do. Isn't that correct?

GENERAL GAVIN. It certainly does not appear adequate at this time.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. You have three commands fighting for less than half of what the Army needs alone. . . .

THAT about describes the appalling state of U.S. military airlift in this flying age. However, a few not unimportant strings should be tied in to keep it all in perspective.

Development and procurement of military cargo planes lags behind other military aircraft. For tactical airlift the now old Fairchild C-119 is the workhorse. It is being supplanted by the Fairchild C-123, a plane long in the works and only now becoming operational, and the new Lockheed C-130. Correspondents attending the Moscow air show with General Twining noted that the Soviet Union had developed an assault carrier somewhat similar to our C-123. This demonstrates the drive toward air mobility of the Soviet Army and, considering the acknowledged competency of the Soviet aircraft industry, ought to shake our complacency.

For strategic airlift the only U.S. plane especially designed for Army cargo is the Douglas C-124. Two new planes in the strategic airlift class are in the works. One is the 50-ton Douglas C-133, a few of which are scheduled to appear in the next few years; the other—the C-132 (also

by Douglas)—is still under development.

MATS has, of course, transport aircraft other than C-124s: C-118s (DC-6), C-121s (Constellation) and even the old C-54 (DC-4), for example. But as General Gavin makes clear in the following quotation, they are unsuited for the Army task or will not be available:

"Of these types there are passenger aircraft, with doors that are limited for the passage of individuals mostly, usually of rather weak floor strength, sometimes not equipped with the tiedown facilities and so on needed to move cargo, though some of them do have it, and I presume that it is assumed that in the event of an emergency, individuals could be transported in this type of aircraft and perhaps some adjustment made to provide cargo lift in the regular cargo type aircraft such as the 124."

General Gavin does not consider this assumption sound. "As I have stated earlier it would seem to me that if the situation required the movement of forces on an emergency basis overseas, MATS would have its peak load imposed upon it also and it would require nearly all of its aircraft to meet its missions. . . . If we took the 124s away from MATS, I would assume that it would be only sound to plan on the remainder being available for normal MATS functions."

Much the same situation exists with reference to the nation's civil air fleet. Few of the planes are capable of handling Army combat loads and the demands upon them from other sources will be overwhelming in a time of national emergency.

It isn't entirely a question of whether the nation can afford the several hundred transport aircraft the program requires. It can. Nor is it a question of whether these plans would sit around and become old while awaiting a call that might never come. Both of these questions ignore the possible economies of air logistics today. There are competent studies that show that the economics of air delivery compares very favorably with surface lift, especially by reducing pipeline requirements and the added capability of responding fast to user requests. MASS (Modern Army Supply System) described in last month's **ARMY** is predicated upon the growing use of air carriers. Fast electronic bookkeeping, requisitioning and stock-recording presuppose the fastest possible methods of delivery if the largest economies are to be obtained. All this suggests that the investment of money in adequate air lift would be returned in other ways than the big and important purpose of giving the fire brigade a chance to get to the bonfire before it flares into a worldwide conflagration.

THETHE choice that would seem to face the nation is between maintaining a minimum three-division airlift fleet (two tactical and one strategic) for Army use or practically declining to implement the deterrent effect of ready and mobile Army forces and thus assuring initial defeat at a time and place selected by the aggressor. One would think the Korean lesson would have been remembered longer than this.

A battalion combat team from the 82d Airborne Division jumps from C-124s which airlifted it to Greenland for an arctic exercise

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

From Both Sides

EISENHOWER'S SIX GREAT DECISIONS: Europe, 1944-45

By Walter Bedell Smith
Longmans, Green & Company, 1956

237 Pages; Index; \$3.95

THE FATAL DECISIONS: The Battles of Britain, Moscow, El Alamein, Stalingrad, France 1944, The Ardennes

Edited by Seymour Freiden and William Richardson
William Sloane Associates, 1956

302 Pages; Maps; Index; \$4.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. PAUL D. HARKINS

General Smith has condensed to book form a series that appeared some years ago in *The Saturday Evening Post*. He has added some comments by the captured German generals who were to suffer the impact of the decisions.

The chapters cover: "The Invasion Tide," "Normandy Turning Point," "The Ardennes Counteroffensive," "Victory West of the Rhine," "Encirclement of the Ruhr," and "The Only Way It Could End."

In a chapter entitled "Prelude to Invasion" General Smith reviews the make-up of SHAEF and recites the complexities encountered in the establishment of such a combined headquarters. He gives a brief description of the functions of the various staff elements and mentions how the Chief of Staff is responsible for the final coordination of all agencies prior to making recommendations to the commanding general. General Smith also points out the awful loneliness of a commander who shoulders the responsibility of sending thousands of troops into action knowing some will never return. General Eisenhower experienced such a period of loneliness in making the decision on the timing of the Normandy invasion. After all preparations were in order and preliminary movements initiated, stormy weather threatened to upset the plans. At his advanced command post, after listening to all his advisers, including the weather experts, General Eisenhower sat in lonely silence "on a sofa before a bookcase which filled the end of the room." For full five minutes not a word was said. The air was tense as he weighed every consideration. Finally, General Eisenhower looked up; the tension was gone from his face. He said briskly, "Well, we'll go!"

For those of us were on the receiving end of these "Great Decisions," it is interesting to reflect on the many ramifications that go into their making. Finally the decisions get down to Corporal Smith or Jones in the front-line foxhole, who says when the word comes, "Let's go!"

It's as simple as that, but if the corporal's squad is pinned down and can't move, the impact is reflected back through the chain of command and other decisions are required all along the line.

It is interesting that at the same time *General Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions* was published, another book, *The Fatal Decisions*, also became available. *The Fatal Decisions* is the inside stories of the German commanders and the decisions made for them by Hitler that finally brought the German forces to defeat. An interesting contrast is the latitude and flexibility allowed General Eisenhower in conducting the military campaign, once the high governmental decisions had been made. This was not so on the enemy side. The German commanders retained little flexibility of action. Though the German staff procedures were approximately the same, the final decision was always made by the inflexible Führer. The Führer's decisions were certainly fatal. The results of two of Eisenhower's Great Decisions are amply reflected in two chapters of *The Fatal Decisions*: "The Battle of France, 1944," and "The Battle of the Ardennes." For those interested in reading military history it is satisfying to read first a chapter from General Smith's book, then immediately pick up the threads of the action in the enemy's camp by reading the corresponding chapter in *The Fatal Decisions*. It will be very interesting when we compare the Russian version of "The Battle of Moscow" and "The Battle of Stalingrad" with the stories of the battles as related in *The Fatal Decisions*.

The Fatal Decisions comprises reports by six German commanders with commentary by General Siegfried Westphal, and foreword by S. L. A. Marshall, who

was Chief Historian of the European Theater.

General Werner Kreipe's contribution, "The Battle of Britain," deals with the Luftwaffe when Hitler was planning the invasion of England; General Gunther Blumentritt contributes "The Battle of Moscow" chapter; General Fritz Bayerlein, "The Battle of El Alamein;" General Kurt Zeitzler, "The Battle of Stalingrad;" General Bodo Zimmerman, "The Battle of France, 1944;" and General Hasso von Manteuffel, "The Battle of the Ardennes." All these high officers were present when the battles of which they write were lost and they tell, candidly and bluntly, why the Germans lost World War II.

This is an important and fascinating volume crowded with candid comments and factual sketches of German operations on both the western and eastern fronts during the war. The candor includes many harsh criticisms of Hitler and Goering, reminiscent of what the new Russian leaders have recently been saying of Stalin; but it likewise includes high praise for the Royal Air Force and for some of the American and British battlefield heroes.

"The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain," says General Westphal, "had proved that it was not possible to force a brave country to its knees solely by means of aerial bombardment."

When the German Sixth Army was hemmed in at Stalingrad during the campaign that was intended to bring the Soviet Union to her knees, Hitler refused to approve a "fighting withdrawal" or attempted breakthrough. "I am not leaving the Volga!" he shouted. Goering, on his part, declared that he could keep the Sixth Army supplied. So, by Hitler's orders, Stalingrad became what he was pleased to call "The Sixth Army Fortress;" and as Goering's relief plan failed, the 250,000 encircled German troops were forced in the end to surrender. Colonel General Zeitzler, who reports on Stalingrad, then went to Hitler and asked to be dismissed as Chief of the General Staff. "Hitler," Zeitzler says, "was furious, and replied roughly: 'A general is not entitled to abandon his post.' In Zeitzler's opinion, the defeat at Stalingrad was the turning point of the entire war.

In the chapter on El Alamein, General Bayerlein reports Hitler as advising the hard-pressed Rommel that "there can be no other consideration save that of holding fast, of not retreating one step, of throwing every gun and every man into battle." And then Bayerlein quotes what Rommel wrote in his diary: "What we



"Finally the decisions get down to Corporal Smith or Jones . . . who says when the word comes, 'Let's go!'"

needed were guns, fuel, planes; what we did not need were orders to hold fast."

As for the situation in France just prior to the Allied invasion, General Zimmerman writes: "To conceal the real weakness of Germany's Western defenses Hitler ordered the building of fortifications along the coast, with greatest intensity along the channel, during 1942. Gigantic concrete structures sprung up, but of course it was impossible to complete these strong fortifications everywhere, let alone arm this Atlantic Wall;" and again: "During the spring of 1943 Rundstedt attempted to report to Hitler on the actual situation as it then existed in the West. It was the time wasted."

In writing of the invasion of Normandy, General Zimmerman pays tribute to American and British heroes: "In addition to the names of General Eisenhower and Montgomery from July on we were to hear more of General Patton. . . He was reported to be an expert commander of armored troops and something of a daredevil. We nicknamed him 'The American Guderian.'" Similar compliments are paid to Generals Alexander and Montgomery in connection with the El Alamein defeat described by General Bayerlein.

The bitter criticisms of the Führer and also of Goering are many. Indeed, these two leaders of the German forces have to take the brunt of the complaints, since it was the custom for all German officers to wait for the Führer's decisions, and on his part, Hitler showed unbounded confidence in Goering's plans and statements.

The blunt condemnation, together with the frank factual reports on decisive battles, makes *The Fatal Decisions* an important study of German military and political actions during World War II. It also throws light on the atmosphere of abject idolatry sustained from first to last at Hitler's several headquarters. On the other hand, this expert review of Germany's military defeat pays tribute to the pluck and power of the enemy.

The interview on the Obersalzberg which lasted some three hours consisted of a two-hour monologue by Hitler giving his views on the Eastern Front, followed by a tea hour during which the discussion of official matters was forbidden. Rundstedt's mounting fury as he shifted in his chair can well be imagined. Later came the Führer's Directive No. 51 in which it was laid down that the enemy must not be allowed to maintain a foothold on the coast, but must be thrown back into the sea at once. And so it goes on, this detailed and authoritative story of a German Army badgered, neglected and finally sacrificed by an egomaniac.

General Westphal sums it all up in the last chapter when he says that the decisions under discussion were not truly fa-

tal; that is, they turned no assured triumph into defeat, "the fundamental and truly fatal decision was the one which was based on Hitler's erroneous assumption that the Western Powers would permit Hitler to destroy Poland without intervening on the side of their ally. Once the decision to invade Poland had been taken our destiny was sealed."

Yes, Hitler used to like to let bad situations mature; he did in so many instances that they rotted.

Pioneering Work

MILITARY CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS

By Major Mark M. Boatner, III
David McKay Company, 1956
176 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.75

Reviewed by
COL. S. LEGREE

There has long been a need for a book on military customs and traditions; all honor is due Major Boatner and the publisher for taking the plunge and making this book available. There is little question but that the United States Army, considering its preoccupation with leadership and the distinctive qualities of the American soldier, has received little dividend from our long tradition of courage and strategem. At times the War Department and Department of the Army have seemed to take delight in reshuffling organizations so that traditions become lost or, worse, abandoned.

It is easy to criticize a book of this sort, and almost anyone with a typewriter can point out mistakes in organization, emphasis, attitude and what-have-you. But let's realize that this is a pioneering work; that the field is wide open to subjective opinions; and that Major Boatner is *sui generis* as an officer and as a person. Any intelligent reader with ten years of service could mention things that should have been included, and weren't, and things that were included that could just as well have been left out—for instance, in soldier slang, "Macht nichts," German 'It doesn't matter,'" or a full page on Edgar Allan Poe at West Point.

THE MONTH'S REVIEWERS

Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

Colonel S. Legree is the pseudonym of an Artilleryman of long service.

Raymond L. Garthoff, a specialist in Soviet military affairs, is a contributor to **ARMY** and the author of *Soviet Military Doctrine* (1953).

Lt. Col. Spurgeon H. Neel, a frequent contributor to **ARMY**, is Aviation Medicine Consultant to The Surgeon General.

For my part, I wish the book mentioned some of the happier contacts with the Marines, contacts which made the Marines in World War II call the Army's 77th Division the "77th Marines," or the warmth of feeling between World War I Marines and the 2d Engineers. But add all these suggestions and you'd have a \$10.00 book.

The next edition—and there will be more editions—should have an index, even if it brings the price up another 25¢.

Valuable Despite Errors

SOVIET AIR POWER

By Richard E. Stockwell
Pageant Press, 1956
283 Pages with Separate Supplement; \$7.50

Reviewed by
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

The main contribution of the present book—and it is a real contribution—is that it represents the most substantial compilation of information on Soviet military aviation developments available to the public. Unfortunately, but understandably, the book is spotted with many errors, some of which are important. But the general picture and the basic trends of Soviet aviation development are there, and are well brought out and presented in a readable form. The author justly asks that "the result be judged in terms of the problem" of acquiring information, and he frankly states that "for the most part, this book is a reporting effort." It is a very good reporting effort considering the dearth of reliable sources of information, but the military reader may also find it advisable to adopt another standard of evaluation. Before reviewing some of the errors which regrettably make it necessary to accept much of the detailed information only with reserve, a number of points which this book usefully illuminates deserve special notice.

Relatively little has been written on the Soviet aviation designers—Tupolev, Mikoyan, Iliushin, Lavochkin, and the others—who are too often known to us only by the initials they lend to their products. These men occupy a position without direct parallel in the United States. They head design bureaus and compete for new design acceptances, they help to formulate requirements, and they are generals in the Air Force's Engineering Technical Service. Stockwell effectively introduces them to the reader in the course of the brief historical review in the first chapter.

Soviet military aviation designing is also distinguished from that in this country by certain principles. One key of these is the requirement for simplicity. Stockwell cogently describes the Soviet objectives and achievements in increasing overall efficiency and strength through vigorous pursuit of simplicity.

The heart of the book is contained in

■ Selected Check List of the Month's Books ■

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL: The Story of the Naval War of 1812. By C. S. Forester. Doubleday & Company, 1956. 284 Pages; Index; \$5.00. The famous novelist offers a refreshing view of the naval side of the War of 1812; a good try at objectivity by a competent British writer.

AMERICAN HERITAGE, June 1956. American Heritage, 1956. 112 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.95. This issue of the bimonthly magazine that looks like a book will appeal to the soldier because there are several articles of particular military interest, including one by Major Reginald Hargreaves on Burgoyne, and a personal experience story by a Revolutionary War soldier.

THE DYNAMICS OF AGING. By Ethel Sabin Smith. W. W. Norton & Company, 1956. 191 Pages; \$2.95. Preparing mentally for your later years, based on psychology and philosophy. Readable; believable.

EISENHOWER: THE INSIDE STORY. By Robert J. Donovan. Harper & Brothers, 1956. 423 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.95. The story of the workings of the Eisenhower administration that caused a newspaper flare-up at the end of June, and put a Presidential secretary on the spot. Good reporting, fairly objective.

HOW THE SOVIET SYSTEM WORKS. By Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn. Harvard University

Press, 1956. 274 Pages; Index; \$4.75. A scholarly study by the Russian Research Center at Harvard, under contract to the Air Force. Very heavy going; not a get-rich-quick course in what makes Russia tick. Invaluable for those with an intelligent interest in the fundamentals that are the bases of military and political intelligence.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH FOR MANAGEMENT, Volume II. Edited by Joseph F. McCloskey and John M. Coppering. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. 563 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$8.00. The mathematically minded reader will enjoy these case histories of the application of operations research methods. Some of the questions considered include better bombing accuracy, handling traffic at toll booths, utilization of training aircraft, and failure of complex equipment. The book explains how operations research, becoming more important in the military each day, is used as a tool.

THE RETIREMENT HANDBOOK. By Joseph C. Buckley. Harper & Brothers, 1956. 329 Pages; Index; \$3.95. A revision of the 1953 edition, written for civilians but extremely useful to military personnel. The author recommends keeping busy, but not too busy or under pressure. Contains hints on money management, health, new careers, and where to live.

THE SOVIET SECRET SERVICES. By Otto Heilbrunn. Frederick A. Praeger,

1956. 216 Pages; Index; \$4.50. A well-documented study of how the Soviets organize and use secret agents in enemy and neutral countries for espionage and sabotage. "We too must be able to wage a war without a battlefield."

TAKE THESE MEN. By Cyril Joly. Constable & Company, 1956. 337 Pages. A personal experience story of British armor in North Africa, "in which all the major incidents are true and only the characters fictitious." Neither novel nor unit history, it falls somewhere between the two, and would have been more convincing as one or the other. Armor enthusiasts will find it worth their while.

WASHINGTON IS WONDERFUL. By Dorothy Jones. Harper & Brothers, 1956. 278 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75. A different kind of guide book, more chatty than the usual, and particularly applicable to the family about to come to Washington to live.

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE DRAFT AND MILITARY SERVICE. Edited by John Gourlie. Washington Data Service, 1956. 36 Pages; \$2.95. That price for 36 pages may seem a bit stiff, but this looseleaf volume comes under the heading of a business reference rather than a book. There is much good information here for those who advise young men, but keeping it up to date, even with the looseleaf feature, will be a chore.

three chapters on Soviet aircraft, airplane power plants, and missiles, and in a separate accompanying supplement to the book presenting in handy chart form the main performance and other characteristics of Soviet aircraft. There is also a very good description of the postwar Soviet impressment and exploitation of German scientists and engineers. Stockwell, whose background particularly prepares him to deal with these subjects, does so to the full extent that material available to him permits. To note but one conclusion of particular interest, he estimates that by 1958 the Soviets will have a force of 900 Badger medium jet bombers and 500 Bison heavy jet bombers.

He examines Soviet civil aviation, and the training of youth in this field, in two interesting and informative chapters. The author points to the real challenge of Soviet air-mindedness in the youth, and the high prestige and material rewards to the Soviet citizen who enters this field.

Soviet aviation, as this book indicates, is a field on which reliable information is scarce. It does not, therefore, reflect on

the author's industry and competence that there are numerous errors.

The discussions of present Soviet military organization and command, while basically sound, include a number of incorrect statements. For example, there are no organizations such as "LOPI," an alleged fighter-bomber command; "NOFLOT"; "MDEP," an alleged arctic ADD command; nor nationwide inner and outer zones of air defense. Also, Stalin's son Vasily may indeed be in Siberia, but not as "an important commander" there, nor was he ever chief of the fighter interceptor forces. The fighter interceptors are not presently under any "General A. L. Torechich," and the Long Range Air Force has not been under Chief Marshal of Aviation (not "Marshal") Golovanov since the latter's relief in 1948. The recent police organization headed by Serov is not the MGB, which was abolished in 1953, but the KGB created in 1954. The Long Range Air Force is now called DA (*Dal'naya Aviatsiya*), and no longer ADD. The Naval Air Force is now termed the A-VMS, and not the VVS-VMF.

There are also a number of incorrect identifications of the Russian designations for various Soviet aircraft, which cannot be reviewed here, and some errors of Soviet air force trends which should be noticed. Thus the Il-28 is a light bomber only and not in attack aviation, even though it performs ground support missions. The Tu-14 is found only in the Naval Air Force. The Long Range Air Force was not equipped with Barge. The jet strength and modernity of the naval air arm is greatly understated, but the Soviets are not building aircraft carriers. It is curious and erroneous to state that the Il-28 "usually is seen in Eastern Siberia." There are only known to be a few Tu-70 four-engine transports, by no means a fleet of 1,200. The Badger is not used as a transport (appended note); the Camel jet transport (Tu-104) is adapted from the Badger but by even a different designer.

In the final chapter, which is described by the author as giving his "own convictions and beliefs," several questions are very briefly raised. In particular, this

reviewer considers that the author dismisses much too facilely the significance of nuclear parity. Without question, we must always be prepared—in every sense—for a Soviet attack. But there is no evidence for, and considerable against, the bald assertion that: "Perhaps nuclear warfare is too fearful for the West to contemplate, but never for the Russians." It is quite correct to state that the Soviets will launch a war "as long as they feel they have more to gain than to lose," but there are many signs that the Soviets realize that all-out thermonuclear war would not gain for them more than they would lose, even at best. Finally, the author's criticism of American Intelligence may or may not be in part justified, but it is difficult to see why the author considers himself competent to conclude that the American taxpayer "hasn't gotten his money's worth."

It is useful to close with the same point which the author has stressed in his concluding chapter: namely, that we have lost considerable ground in relative technological competition with the Soviet Union. This book should help to create an awareness of this need, and with the reservations noted it is to be recommended.

Medical Expansion

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II; The Technical Services: The Medical Department, Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of the Interior

By Clarence McK. Smith
Office of Chief of Military History, 1956
503 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00

Reviewed by
LT. COL. SPURGEON H. NEEL

This latest volume of the series *U. S. Army in World War II* is a comprehensive documentation of the planning, development and operation of the huge Army hospitalization and evacuation system during the period 1939-46. The author achieves excellent perspective by including considerable detail concerning the organization and changing functions within the Office of The Surgeon General, and some detail related to the operation of the hospitalization and evacuation systems in major overseas theaters of operations.

Mr. Smith emphasizes logistical problems encountered in the development of the largest hospitalization and evacuation system ever established by the U.S. Army, and the manner in which these problems were resolved. He specifically excludes clinical considerations from the scope of this volume.

The book is logically divided into four major parts, the first three dealing with hospitalization and the fourth with evacuation. Part One describes hospitalization during the emergency period from 8 September 1939 through 7 December 1941. Part Two relates the early development

of the hospitalization system during the early war years from 7 December to mid-1943. Part Three describes the further development of the hospitalization system during the latter years of the war, and adjustment during the immediate post-hostilities period. Part Four is concerned with evacuation to and within the Zone of the Interior, including the utilization of land, sea and aerial means. The author maintains an unbiased attitude, giving equal emphasis to mistakes as well as successes.

The volume relates how the Army, beginning with a relatively small number of hospitals operating on a peacetime status, expanded its facilities within the United States and converted them for the reception of large numbers of patients generated within the Zone of the Interior as well as thousands of casualties from overseas theaters. Particular emphasis is given the major construction and conversion program, modification of administrative and personnel staffing policies and procedures, development of improved medical regulating practices, and revision of overseas medical organizations and procedures. Two major problems existed throughout the narrative: First, the necessity of reconciling the rapidly expanding requirements of the Army with the maintenance of proper standards of hospital service. Secondly, the necessity of producing unity of effort in a hospital system subject to divided control. The manner in which these two problems were resolved is one of the more useful features of the book.

This volume is of considerable value to all medical logisticians as well as clinicians. It is the first comprehensive history of Army hospitalization and evacuation in a major war since the publication more than thirty years ago of *The Medical Department of the U. S. Army in the World War*. It contains detailed data and references of extreme value in mobilization planning, and in the organization and expansion of hospitalization and evacuation systems in the future, when the time element may not be as favorable as in World War II. Of particular interest to the reviewer was the major controversy over the position and responsibilities of The Surgeon General, and his relation to ground, air and service support commands. The historical facts and their implications, as related in this book, merit full consideration by all those concerned with reorganization of the Army.

This volume is of sufficient historical and current value to merit its being read and retained as a reference by all who are concerned with logistical planning and operations, particularly those responsible for the development of hospitalization and evacuation policies, organization and procedures. These lessons of the past provide a useful guide to future practice.

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Report from your AUSA CP

Annual Meeting arrangements require major staff efforts at this time, and take up Executive Council members' spare moments -- and more. The dates, for those who didn't mark them on calendar, are 25, 26, 27 October. The place: Washington, D. C. Prospects become more exciting as plans unfold.

At this writing more than half of booth space for exhibitors has already been sold. The items to be displayed will be an excellent cross-section of industrial support in the military field; examining the exhibits will be a painless way to see what is coming in your profession. Industry support of the Annual Meeting exceeds all expectations.

New brochure detailing Association's new look is off the press. Handy eight-page booklet is excellent short handbook for those who want to know what AUSA does, its history, its future, its Aims and Objectives, categories of membership, etc. Members interested in having copy write Secretary; we'll drop one in mail pronto.

Resolutions Committee reminds membership that By-Laws require consideration of Resolutions to avoid ramrodding them through without proper thought. Resolutions from floor at Annual Meeting will be considered at next meeting of Council of Trustees (name of new governing body after Annual Meeting). Better way is to submit proposed resolutions to Secretary, so Executive Council and Resolutions Committee can act before Annual Meeting. Deadline for resolutions, to be considered by Committee and pub-

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components and providing for and assuring the Nation's military security." (Statement by the Executive Council, Association of the U. S. Army; adopted 14 December 1953.)

lished in ARMY, is 15 August. Have resolutions in Secretary's hands by that date to assure proper consideration.

Korean MAG, in letter signed by Col. Leo E. Schulten, Senior TAG Advisor, requests donations of military manuals, texts and other books for ROK Military Service Schools. Mentioned are books on military tactics and strategy, history, national and international policy, biographies of military leaders, memoirs by commanders of modern warfare. Units, organizations, individuals donating books should indicate name of contributor; names of donors will be inscribed in each book. Address correspondence and packages to: Chief, Korean Military Advisory Group, Attn: Senior TAG Advisor, AP0 102, San Francisco, California. This appears to be worthy cause; as you weed out your library for newer volumes remember this request.



COL. SHIMKIN

When Col. Shimkin attended his first meeting as member of Executive Council, staff found that photograph on these pages in June issue, labeled as Col. Shimkin, was another officer entirely. Error was an exceedingly rare accident of mislabeling by Signal Corps photo library which has no less than 28,000 portraits on file. Our apologies to both officers.

Executive Council held regular June meeting at Association offices 14 June. The meeting was fairly short. The Secretary's report was accepted without debate, and Committee reports were quickly approved. The Membership Committee recommended two technical changes in the By-Laws, which were held over for the next meeting as provided in the By-Laws. A letter from General Palmer to General Roper, expressing appreciation for General Roper's efforts in pushing the reorganization plan, was read to the Council, which went on record as indorsing General Palmer's comments.

Organization Committee is now working on organization of Chapters, ROTC Companies. No hard decisions or recommendations have been made, but a good guess is that there will be two types of local organizations, one for military and civilian members, another for ROTC cadets. State and regional organizations will follow later, after chapters get shaken down and need for intervening echelons is established. Army posts, cities, ROTC institutions interested in forming chapters should write

Secretary immediately. By time this appears in print, there is sure to be authority and regulations to enable live-wire groups and individuals to begin organization.

Former Coast Artillerymen will be pleased to know that Corps' famed Oozlefinch has new lease on life. Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood, CG AA&GM Center, has recalled famed bird from 1948 retirement to serve Center. Bird's duties are classified, but Order of the Oozlefinch, with five degrees, and with membership certificates already printed, offers some hint as to assignment. Legends built around Oozlefinch are many, some believable, but assignment to Guided Missiles should introduce entirely new crop of stories.



OOZLEFINCH

AUGUST 1956

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YOUR SECRETARY

BOOKS OF PERMANENT VALUE



Histories of America's Wars—Formal, Informal and Pictorial

Books which are boxed in bold type have not appeared in the Book List before.

COMPREHENSIVE HISTORIES OF AMERICAN WARS

American Campaigns. Col. Matthew F. Steele. Long used as a text at West Point, Steele's brief studies of campaigns from the Revolution up to the Spanish-American War as classics. Text only, without maps. \$6.00

The American Wars: A Pictorial History from Quebec to Korea. Roy Meredith. America's wars as seen by artists in uniform. Profusely illustrated. 320 pages. \$10.00

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

From Lexington to Liberty. Bruce Lancaster. An excellent one-volume history of the Revolution. A good place to start your reading on this much-neglected war. \$5.75

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THE CIVIL WAR

The Civil War in Pictures. Commentary by Fletcher Pratt. Here is the Civil War as newspaper artists of the day saw it and reported it. More than 300 illustrations. \$10.00

The Civil War on Western Waters. By Fletcher Pratt. The story of the battle for control of the Mississippi waterways. \$3.50

Well-Rounded History—

In the books below, Bruce Catton has written both an accurate military history of the Civil War and an unusually perceptive and human account of what war meant to the people who took part in or were caught by it. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in history for the final volume, *A Stillness at Appomattox*.

Mr. Lincoln's Army \$4.00
A Stillness at Appomattox \$5.00

Decisive Battles of the Civil War. Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell. The best one-volume summary of the Civil War to be found. If you're just beginning your reading in this period, begin it with this book. Excellent maps. \$4.00

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Mr. Lincoln's Admirals. By Clarence Macartney. Biographical analyses of the principal Union admirals. \$5.00

U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition. Bruce Catton. An analytical study of Grant's impact on military concepts and of the concepts which had influenced him. \$3.00

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Miracle of World War II. By Francis Walton. History of American industry in WW II, and the problems that had to be solved to arm the nation for victory. \$7.50

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The following monographs, prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, have long been acclaimed as ranking with the best tactical studies in the history of warfare.

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The Army Air Forces in World War II. *W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate*. The authors, professional historians, have written this comprehensive history on the basis of official AAF files, enemy records, interviews, and the results of other research. It covers equipment, training, and operations in all theaters of war.

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WORLD WAR II—THE WAR ON LAND, LOGISTICS, AND THE HIGH COMMAND

The U. S. Army in World War II. Published by the Office, Chief of Military History, U. S. Army, under the direction of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian. The volumes which follow are part of the greatest effort ever made in the field of military history to document and evaluate the conduct of war. It will be a rare student who will read all of the books listed below, but it will also be a rare soldier who cannot find in many of them information that will be both interesting and valuable to him.

Approach to the Philippines. *Robert R. Smith*. \$6.25
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Cross-Channel Attack. *G. A. Harrison*. A book that has become the standard work on organization of large-scale combined operations. \$6.75
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The QM Corps—Organization, Supplies, Service. *Erna Risch*. \$3.75

Vol. I \$3.75

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Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls. *Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love*. \$5.75

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